Here is an inconsistent triad of propositions: There are certain pure “ticking bomb” cases (e.g. of the sort that I considered in my last post on this topic), in which torture (even on the part of a state official) is all-things-considered morally permissible. It is […] Read More
Friday 3rd – Sunday 5th July 2009 University of Kent, UK Sponsors: The Analysis Trust, The Mind Association, The University of Kent. Speakers include: Jonathan Dancy, Daniel Elstein, Allan Gibbard, Edward Harcourt, Chris Hookway, Adrian Moore, Michael Smith, Alan Thomas, Pekka Vayrynen, and Nick Zangwill, […] Read More
BGSU alums John Milliken and Galen Foresman, along with current grad student Ben Dyer, have recently launched The Philosopher's Digest, a site featuring "timely reviews of current philosophy articles." Good luck with the venture, gentlemen!
THEMES FROM THE ETHICS OF BERNARD WILLIAMS’, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS, 30 JUNE – 2 JULY 2009 Registration has opened for the 'Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams' Conference, which is taking place between 30 June and 2 July at the University of Leeds. The […] Read More
Some hope to cash out claims about goodness in terms of claims about reasons to respond. One such account is the Buck Passing Account of Value (BPV), which says that to be valuable is to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an […] Read More
PEA Soup's own Laurie Schrage is planning to hand deliver a welcome message to Florida International's new basketball coach, Isaiah Thomas. See the NY Times story here.
The first Annual Arizona Workshop on Normative Ethics will take place in Tucson, Arizona, at the Westward Look Resort on January 7-9, 2010. Keynote speakers will be Thomas E. Hill (UNC, Chapel Hill), Holly Smith (Rutgers), and Peter Railton (Michigan). Those interested in presenting a […] Read More
I apologise for this but I want to return to the Doctrine of Double Effect. One thing that Tim Scanlon said in the comments was that his motivation for arguing against the DDE is, quote: ‘I see no plausible theoretical defense for it’. I wanted […] Read More
Sometimes I hear people (well, philosophers) compare the goodness of one thing with the badness of another. They say, for example, the goodness of pleasure is less than the badness of pain; or pleasure is less good than pain is bad. Do such comparisons make […] Read More