… returns, thanks to Simon Rippon. You can find the feed link in the top Navigation Bar. Thank you, Simon, for getting this global comments feed back up and running for us!
My most compelling intuition is that the effective freedom to achieve a state I could want, even if I don't actually want it, makes me better off so that even if I don't actually want something I'm still worse off for not being able to […] Read More
Right now I’m thinking about the proper descriptive semantics for bare, normative modal statements, statements that use expressions like “must”, “ought”, and “may” normatively but don’t contain explicit restrictor phrases like “legally”, “morally”, or “given what I know”. I’m developing my own account of their […] Read More
Tim Scanlon's new book Moral Dimensions provides an elegant account according to which an agent's mental states are relevant to the question as to whether that agent is blameworthy but not to the question as to whether the agent's behavior itself is morally wrong. As the philosopher […] Read More
Thank you all—contributors, commentators, and readers—for another great year in the Soup! This month marks PEA Soup's fifth "birthday" on the blogosphere, and because of all of you, it was clearly the best. Thank you! To celebrate, we've introduced a new design theme—Lone Tree Green!—and […] Read More
I’ve just read T.M. Scanlon’s chapter on blame in his latest book Moral Dimensions. The discussion is subtle, provocative, and quite insightful. It has already caused me to rethink some of my own views on moral responsibility in general and blame in particular. Nevertheless, I […] Read More
We're pleased to welcome Janice Dowell as the newest PEA Souper. Janice is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska, and she works in metaethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. Welcome aboard, Jan!
The distinction between the 'right' and 'wrong' kind of reasons is taken to play at least three important roles: 'right' kind but not 'wrong' kinds of reasons contribute to standards of correctness, and in the case of reasons for attitudes, 'right' kind but not 'wrong' […] Read More
University of Edinburgh 28-29 June 2009 Speakers: Simon Blackburn, Campbell Brown, Matthew Chrisman, Jonathan Dancy, Jamie Dreier, Graham Hubbs, Kent Hurtig, Elinor Mason, Sean McKeever, Michael Ridge, Michael Smith, and Jay Wallace. (Notice a couple of PEA-Soupers in there.) More information here.