A forum for discussing Philosophy, Ethics, and Academia
Over the last decade, I have been developing an interconnected set of claims and arguments concerning the second-personal character of central moral phenomena. My focus has been the deontic moral notions of obligation, duty, right, wrong, rights, and so on, which I have argued are […] Read More
Here’s an argument against subjectivism about moral wrongness I’ve been kicking around. (By ‘subjectivism’ here I just mean any theory which is not “objective”—that is, a subjective theory is one that has it that that in virtue of which one’s behavior is wrong (when it […] Read More
Helen Frowe wrote me yesterday to try to understand better my position on how to count the agent’s interest in a trolley switching case. The text she was trying to understand was a piece I co-wrote with David Wasserman, called “Agents, Impartiality, and the Priority […] Read More
I am happy to announce that our next Featured Philosopher is Stephen Darwall, who is currently the Andrew Downey Orrick Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. His post titled "Second-Personal Attitudes of the Heart" will be up for discussion on Monday. Please stop by then to […] Read More
I very much love Michael Smith’s recent paper “A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts” (Law, Ethics and Philosophy 2013, also available on his website). One thing that strikes me about this paper is that, whilst discussing Parfit’s views on practical reasons, Smith […] Read More
Hi folks. I thought I'd post a reminder for anyone interested that Bowling Green State University is hosting a conference, "The Scope of Religious Exemptions," on April 17th and 18th. Our keynote speakers are Robert Audi (Notre Dame) and Andy Koppelman (Northwestern). Michael Perry (Emory) and Perry Dane (Rutgers) are presenting their work […] Read More
The University of Southampton will host two one-day workshops in April that might be of interest to Pea Soup readers. The first, on April 13th, is on Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Ethics and Epistemology. The second, on April 18th, is on Ethics and Emotion in […] Read More
Sharon Street has argued that (prominent versions of) quasi-realist expressivism (“expressivism,” for short) has a knowledge problem. Others, such as Allan Gibbard and Jamie Dreier, deny this. I’m inclined to agree with Sharon on this matter, albeit for reasons somewhat different from those she offers […] Read More
I am happy to announce that our next Featured Philosopher is Terence Cuneo from the University of Vermont. Terence's most recent book is Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking, and his post titled "Does Expressivism Have A Knowledge Problem?" will be up […] Read More