A forum for discussing Philosophy, Ethics, and Academia
I’m excited for our upcoming final event in celebration of the 125th anniversary year of Ethics: a discussion with Christine Korsgaard and Tamar Schapiro, on August 4-6. To kick off the discussion, Schapiro and I will ask some initial questions from Korsgaard, on themes from […] Read More
The First Annual Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop (announced here in April) now has a complete lineup, including a new Sanders Prize winner. Program below the fold; and more info at the workshop's web site. To register (for free!) just send email to Russ S-L.
Please join us to discuss Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan‘s “Against Time Bias,” published in the most recent issue of Ethics and available open access here. Caspar Hare has kindly contributed a critical précis, below the fold. It should be an exciting discussion!
Syracuse University will host The International Association for the Philosophy of Death and Dying Conference May 18-20, 2016. There is a call for papers. Submission deadline: November 1, 2015. Keynotes will be Frances Kamm and Shelly Kagan. For more information go here.
The next event of the Ethics and Explanation Project – a one-day workshop – is now scheduled for 12th October 2015 at the University of Nottingham. We are delighted to announce the list of speakers for the workshop: Ben Sachs (St. Andrews), Frans Svensson (Umeå […] Read More
The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy series, published by Oxford University Press and edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, is now calling for papers for its second volume.
We’re excited to announce our next Ethics discussion on Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan‘s “Against Time Bias,” available open access here. Caspar Hare has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis. Join us on July 15-17!
I’m pleased to announce the second discussion of a Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (JESP) article here at PEA Soup. The article in question will be Matt King‘s (University of Alabama at Birmingham) “Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame“. It is, of course, […] Read More
In The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel introduces a distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires that has since become standard in discussions of action theory and moral psychology. But what, exactly, are these categories? Many uses of the term, arguably including Nagel’s own, treat a […] Read More