A forum for discussing Philosophy, Ethics, and Academia
Welcome everyone to PEA Soup‘s second JESP discussion. The target article this time is Matt King‘s (University of Alabama, Birmingham) recent “Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame“, which is a very interesting exploration of when we (and God) are in a position to […] Read More
The Prindle Institute for Ethics has launched a new podcast called Examining Ethics. It’s a long form podcast (typically with three segments). For the foreseeable future there is an arrangement with Oxford University Press to interview an author of a recent book in ethics for […] Read More
The Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University invites applications for three Visiting Research Professorships/Faculty Fellowships for the 2016-2017 academic year.
As one of the final outputs of the Character Project at Wake Forest University (www.thecharacterproject.com), we have produced a number of new videos featuring researchers in philosophy, theology, and psychology. One set of videos is from our final conference in May, 2015. Speakers include Neil […] Read More
It is my pleasure to introduce our next Featured Philosopher, John Deigh. John is a Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Texas, Austin, and he is widely known for his insightful work in moral psychology, the history of philosophy, and for his […] Read More
I’m excited to begin our final event in celebration of the 125th anniversary year of Ethics: a discussion with Christine Korsgaard and Tamar Schapiro. Many thanks to both Korsgaard and Schapiro for this great opportunity to talk to them. To kick off the discussion, Schapiro […] Read More
The Workshop for Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy will take place at Syracuse University on Sept 18-20, 2015. This event is free and open to the public but one must register to attend. The schedule of speakers, including keynote speakers Elizabeth Anderson and Seana Shiffrin, […] Read More
Many philosophers seem to think that – even if the notions of a belief’s being “justified” or “rational” are indeed normative notions, as is widely held to be the case – to say that a belief is “justified” is “rational” is to say something stronger than merely […] Read More
University of Wisconsin-Madison, September 5-7 The goal of this conference is to get action theorists and epistemologists (especially formal epistemologists) together to think about topics related to diachronic rationality and belief. All are welcome, but attendees are expected to have read the papers beforehand. Presenters, […] Read More