In her very good article in the latest Ethics (117, Oct. ’06), “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances,” Tamar Schapiro brings to light a problem with the standard Kantian line for dealing with the flexibility of moral rules, in particular the rule against deception. On the […] Read More
Over at Leiter Reports, there’s an interesting discussion of the lack of venues for publishing discussion notes — see here. The problem is that few journals these days publish discussion notes (which I take to be distinct from full-length articles that discuss some article or […] Read More
The following is an announcement from Russ Shafer-Landau: Dear Colleague, I’m pleased to announce a call for abstracts for the Fourth Annual Metaethics Workshop, to be held at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, on September 7-9, 2007. Gilbert Harman (Princeton) and Nicholas Sturgeon (Cornell) will […] Read More
Think of the person who loves you more than anyone else in this world does. And now think about how that person would feel if you suddenly died. Would he or she be utterly heartbroken? Filled with despair? Or would the person perhaps be deeply […] Read More
The Rutgers Institute for Law and Philosophy will be hosting a one day conference on global justice this coming May 5th at the Rutgers School of Law-Camden. Participants include Charles Beitz, A. J. Julius, Ethan Kapstein, George Letsas, Stephen Macedo, Jamie Mayerfeld, Mathias Risse, and […] Read More
I’d like to raise what I imagine may be a touchy subject but one worth the attention of those in the philosophy profession: We occasionally hear of efforts to shut down undergraduate philosophy degree programs, but rarely do we hear of efforts to shut down […] Read More
A lot of moral theorists are sceptics about Act Consequentialism (AC). For example, some of these sceptics think that we need to qualify AC with the following two agent-relative elements: (i) “deontological constraints”, which forbid us to do certain horrible acts even if those horrible […] Read More
We are pleased to announce that Ralph Wedgwood has accepted our invitation to blog here at PEA Soup. Ralph is CUF Lecturer in Philosophy, and Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford. It’s great to have you aboard, Ralph!
Here’s a quote from Scanlon: A rational person who judges that there to be sufficient grounds for believing that P normally has that belief, and this judgment is normally sufficient explanation for so believing. There is no need to appeal to some further source of […] Read More