Welcome to our newest Ethics discussion, on Agnieszka Jaworska & Julie Tannenbaum's "Person-Rearing Relationships as a Key to Higher Moral Status"! The paper has been made open access here. Margaret Little and Jake Earl kick off the discussion with a critical commentary below the fold. […] Read More
Dear Soupers, Do you enjoy puzzles? Yeah? Well then, let me share one with you. John Basl (Northeastern University) and I have had some fruitful conversations about it; and we have some views about how to address it (and some views about how not to); […] Read More
This is just a reminder that our next Ethics discussion, on Agnieszka Jaworska & Julie Tannenbaum's "Person-Rearing Relationships as a Key to Higher Moral Status," kicks off on Thu, Feb 20. The paper has been made open access here. Margaret Little and Jake Earl are […] Read More
Once again, it's my great pleasure to welcome you to another edition of the Featured Philosophers. I hope you all will welcome Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson! -dd
I've got, well, a worry regarding the "necessity" requirement on the legitimacy of self- or other-defensive force. I don't really work on this stuff, so it's entirely possible that there's an easy, pat answer to this worry. Anyway, I'd be interested to hear what you […] Read More
Hi all, This is just a friendly reminder that this Friday we'll have another post in our Featured Philosophers series, this time from Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson. Mark your calendars! -dd
I’m interested to know what people think are the most compelling objections to subjectivism. I understand subjectivism to be the view that one has a reason to do something iff and because doing that thing would further something that one has a favoring, not truth […] Read More
It's February, which means if your first name starts with a C or D, it's your "special month" to post on the Soup. See Intructions for Contributors. This means you, Sobel. Oh wait, it also means me (and Chike, and Chris, and Chrisoula, and Christian…).
G. A. Cohen has a diagnosis of what he thinks is going wrong with political philosophy, a diagnosis that is supposed to explain why, say, Rawls, Dworkin, and Nagel, or Nozick, Schmidtz, and Gaus, are relatively sanguine about markets, while Cohen thinks markets are inherently […] Read More