We are pleased to announce the next PEA Soup Quarterly Topic (with Awards)!! Every third month, from here on out, we will invite submissions from any of our readers for posts on the Soup about a particular topic in moral and political philosophy. Next up: […] Read More
Brian Jabarian has graciously provided a critical précis, which includes an overview of Rowe & Voorhoeve’s view and arguments, an outline of their central cases, and some points for discussion. The overview appears below. As the second and third parts rely rather heavily on careful […] Read More
The epistemic domain is evaluative. It contains normative facts: you should think Trump is a toss-up to win re-election; reasons: your reason to believe Stephen Miller’s couldn’t write a traffic ticket; evaluative claims: knowing Donald Jr. was too ignorant to engage in criminal conspiracy is […] Read More
From Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann: We would like to invite you to an online experiment on moral judgments. In the experiment, you will be asked to judge for several cases whether the agent in the scenario should perform a certain action. You can enter […] Read More
The program for the November 14-16, 2019 meeting of the fifth New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR 5) is now out, posted here. Registration is free, but because space is limited, it’s first-come, first-served. Email me (dshoemak AT tulane DOT edu) to register.
Very excited that Soup’s next Featured Philosopher is Luvell Anderson. Take it away Luvell! Many thanks to Dave2 for inviting me to contribute to this wonderful site! I am working on a couple of book projects at the moment. One is about the roles race, class, […] Read More
I am interested in the question of whether the relevant government officials and members of the public who together can remove the Confederate monuments, are morally obligated to (of their own volition) remove them. I am going to argue that they have a moral obligation […] Read More
Threshold deontology is a theory which holds that some act which is intrinsically wrong even if it produces the best consequences, can still be morally justified if those consequences surpass a certain threshold of seriousness. It could, for instance be wrong to torture one innocent […] Read More