The Strangeness of the Queerness Argument

Mackie’s queerness argument (QA), in its metaphysical part, goes something like this. Putative facts about our moral obligations supposedly involve objective values that carry normativity – they give us reason to do things. But any such facts would be metaphysically strange, so it’s hard to […] Read More

Poverty of the Moral Stimulus

Recent attempts to revive the Platonic thesis that moral knowledge is innate have attempted to piggy-back on the perceived success of the Chomskian arguments for the thesis that linguistic knowledge is innate. The most important of these arguments has been the Poverty of the Stimulus […] Read More

Souls and Human Beings

I’ve recently found myself having to deal more and more with the gnarly issue of souls in my work. My research focuses primarily on the relation between personal identity and ethics, but the metaphysical possibility of the existence of souls continually throws a monkey wrench […] Read More

Welfare and the Achievement of Goals

I just finished reading Simon Keller’s “Welfare and the Achievement of Goals” for the second time. I had read it earlier when it was just a draft, but I decided that I should read it again now that it appears in the October 2004 issue […] Read More

Welcome to David Sobel

It’s my pleasure to welcome David Sobel as a contributor to PEASoup. David’s currently the chair of the department of philosophy at Bowling Green State University, and he’s published several excellent articles over the years on welfare and practical reason. We’re very happy to have […] Read More

Welcome to Kyle Swan

On behalf of all of us here at PEA Soup, I extend a warm welcome to Kyle Swan, who, happily, has accepted our invitation to be a contributor. Kyle is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota Duluth, specializes in ethical theory, […] Read More