I’m pleased to announce that there will be a moral phenomenology workshop at the University of Arizona this coming November. See the following link: www.moralphenomenology.com. Lots of good folks will be there, and it will be exciting to be in on the ground floor of […] Read More
I just wanted to alert people to two forthcoming ethics conferences that feature some excellent topics and speakers.
Do you want to embarrass a subjectivist about practical reason or well-being? C’mon, you know you do. Well then, all you have to do is ask them if the heroes they so eagerly cite as motivating and explicating and defending subjectivist accounts are themselves subjectivists. […] Read More
This post over at E.G. got me thinking. E.G. writes: "Consider two demands: 1. A moral theory must be able to accommodate many or most of our deeply-held, commonsense intuitions. If a moral theory tells us to do something we feel strongly we ought not […] Read More
In a recent article, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen presents an argument against “real self” views of autonomy and responsibility that, on its face, seems fairly troublesome ("Identification and Responsibility," in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2003): 349-376). Real self views are those that maintain that one […] Read More
Russ Shafer-Landau has sent out the Call for Abstracts for the Second Annual Metaethics Workshop, to be held at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, September 16-18, 2005. Abstracts of 2-3 double-spaced pages are due by May 1, 2005. All the relevant information can be found […] Read More
I recently received an e-mail from a former student proposing a good question: She had recently begun trying to read the contemporary literature in philosophical ethics (the sorts of things you’d find in journals like Ethics, Philoosphical Studies, Mind, Journal of Philosophy, etc.), and needless […] Read More
The call for abstracts for the Utilitarianism 2005 conference is here. The conference is August 11-14 at Dartmouth. All the cool kids will be there.
I promise to avoid bad puns in future titles. David Copp advances a “society-centered” theory (SCT) of the justification of moral standards in Morality, Normativity, and Society. It’s a standard-based theory. “Standard” is used in this context to name a rule or imperative, for example, […] Read More