Russ Shafer-Landau has uploaded some photos from the Metaethics Workshop last October in Madison. I hope Russ does not intend these photos to be part of an overall marketing strategy for next September’s Workshop, because the photos of these PEA Brains and this one will […] Read More
As some of you may already know, Paul Edwards passed away on December 9th. The New York Times Obituary can be found here (login required; thanks to Brian Leiter for the link). Edwards was known mostly for being the editor of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. […] Read More
In Madison, Jamie, echoing Nicholas Unwin, posed a problem for expressivists generally, and for Gibbard specifically. As I understand it, the problem is that expressivists have no apparent semantic account of a certain kind of negation represented in (N2), which is to be distinguished from […] Read More
I’m slated to teach moral theory next quarter, and I’m confronting a problem that’s plagued me in the past: whether (and how) to teach the divine command theory (DCT) of ethics. I’ve taught it in past courses, and have never felt entirely satisfied with how […] Read More
It’s clear from recent posts and comments that we’ve all been thinking much too hard. So in the spirit of holiday good cheer, I hereby present my own effort at the Ultimate Hard Case in Ethics (UHCE). Suggestions for making it still harder are of […] Read More
Suppose that Sue’s considered opinion was that Joe had all things considered most reason to do one thing. In what sense could Sue, in consistency with that thought, earnestly criticize Joe for failing to do something else? Of course, it could be that Sue thinks […] Read More
What is utilitarianism? That may seem like an easy question — the kind of thing one might include on a quiz in one’s Intro to Ethics class with the expectation that every minimally attentive student will get it right. However, I think that the question […] Read More
Jason was in Syracuse yesterday, and told me about this interview with Simon Blackburn from a couple of years ago: http://www.cfh.ufsc.br/ethic@/ETICA1~1.PRN.pdf Blackburn’s explanation of quasi-realism confirmed my non-expert opinion that there is no such thing as quasi-realism. Maybe someone can set me straight. Here is […] Read More
This is the sixth of a series of posts in which I try to make clear the different embedding difficulties that, as a family, are thought to present the most pressing objection to expressivism and to distinguish the different kinds of expressivism toward which each […] Read More