Think of the person who loves you more than anyone else in this world does. And now think about how that person would feel if you suddenly died. Would he or she be utterly heartbroken? Filled with despair? Or would the person perhaps be deeply […] Read More
The Rutgers Institute for Law and Philosophy will be hosting a one day conference on global justice this coming May 5th at the Rutgers School of Law-Camden. Participants include Charles Beitz, A. J. Julius, Ethan Kapstein, George Letsas, Stephen Macedo, Jamie Mayerfeld, Mathias Risse, and […] Read More
I’d like to raise what I imagine may be a touchy subject but one worth the attention of those in the philosophy profession: We occasionally hear of efforts to shut down undergraduate philosophy degree programs, but rarely do we hear of efforts to shut down […] Read More
A lot of moral theorists are sceptics about Act Consequentialism (AC). For example, some of these sceptics think that we need to qualify AC with the following two agent-relative elements: (i) “deontological constraints”, which forbid us to do certain horrible acts even if those horrible […] Read More
We are pleased to announce that Ralph Wedgwood has accepted our invitation to blog here at PEA Soup. Ralph is CUF Lecturer in Philosophy, and Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford. It’s great to have you aboard, Ralph!
Here’s a quote from Scanlon: A rational person who judges that there to be sufficient grounds for believing that P normally has that belief, and this judgment is normally sufficient explanation for so believing. There is no need to appeal to some further source of […] Read More
Call for papers and other details concerning the the First Annual Conference of the Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Polical Philosophy can be found here.
Having posted on Mackie’s argument from relativity some time ago, I’d like to return to it now and ask whether the argument (or at least what I think is the best version of it) is inconsistent with other components of Mackie’s error theory. In its […] Read More
Consider the following passage from Scanlon: [B]eing good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons. (Scanlon 1998, […] Read More