PEA Soup readers may be interested in this conference on Agency. Agency at the Intersection We are pleased to announce the 2007 Conference on Agency and Responsibility, to be held at Indiana University, Bloomington on September 13-15, 2007.
It is often supposed that people are not morally responsible for their behavior when that behavior is the product of non-culpable ignorance, but the issue becomes considerably more complex when the ignorance in question is concerned only with moral truths. Suppose that an agent knows […] Read More
Thank you all for helping me, in the previous thread, to clarify what is at stake in being able to provide, for expressivism, a logic based on the preservation of content rather than one based on the (ir)rationality of holding certain combinations of attitudes. In this […] Read More
I have started in on a paper in which I show how expressivists can use a certain kind of semantic theory. The semantic theory, which originated with Kirk Ludwig, is based on the story Kirk and I tell here about the semantics for nondeclaratives and, […] Read More
The second Minnesota I.C.E. (International Conference in Ethics) will take place at the University of Minnesota on Friday, June 29 through Sunday, July 1. Speakers include Julia Annas, Macalester Bell, Garrett Cullity, Rosalind Hursthouse (via videoconference), Anselm Mueller, Rebecca Stangl, Karen Stohr, Christine Swanton, and […] Read More
There are three conferences coming up for those of us with interests in the ethics of children and families. The first is one I organized with some fellow Canadians. "Children, Family, and the State" is the wrap up conference of a three year Social Sciences […] Read More
We’re pleased to announce another new member to the list of PEA Soup contributors, Elisa Hurley. Elisa is currently a Greenwall post-doc fellow at Johns Hopkins, but she will join the faculty at the University of Western Ontario this fall. She received her Ph.D. from […] Read More
I’m interested in children’s rights but also more generally in the relationship between rights and value. Many, or most, children’s rights are justified in terms of the adult persons that the children may become and the goods those adults lives may contain. Perhaps the most […] Read More
The following is conceivable: the features that make an action right are not the features which one ought to attend to when reasoning about whether to perform the action. In consequentialist lingo (I think I’m getting this correct), what’s right-making is not necessarily a blueprint […] Read More