Update: Program for the 2007 Metaethics Workshop

Via Russ Shafer-Landau: The program for the 4th Annual Metaethics Workshop (Sept 7-9, 2007) has been finalized. It is available (with much other relevant information) on the Workshop’s website: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/info/2007/Metaethics_Workshop/ Papers for the workshop will be posted on the website at some point during the […] Read More

Welcome, Jimmy Lenman!

We are pleased to announce that Jimmy Lenman, a regular commentator on PEA Soup, has accepted our invitation to be contributor here at PEA  Soup.  Most of you know that Jimmy is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, President of the British Society […] Read More

No State-Given Reasons

Reasons are facts that count in favor of some intentional attitude, such as a belief, a desire, or an intention to act. And reasons to A (where ‘A’ stands for some intentional attitude) can be divided into two subcategories. First, there are those reasons to […] Read More

The Proto-Frege-Geach Problem

When I first met Jonathan Dancy three years ago, I remember him mentioning the early emotivist papers in Analysis. One night year and a half ago, I was working at the library and things weren’t really going anywhere so I thought I’d check those out. […] Read More

Teaching metaethics to undergraduates

Greetings, all.  Sorry that my first official post will be so mundane, but here goes.  I’ll be teaching an upper-level undergraduate course in metaethics for the first time this fall.  I’m wondering if anyone who has taught metaethics at this level can recommend an anthology […] Read More

Call for Papers – BSET 2008

CALL FOR PAPERSTHE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL THEORY2008 CONFERENCEUniversity of Edinburgh, UK14-16th July 2008Invited Speakers: Barbara Herman (UCLA), Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund)Papers are invited for the annual conference of the British Society for EthicalTheory, to be held at the University of Edinburgh. The subject area is […] Read More

Incoherentism

File this under “meta-meta-ethics” Don Loeb and Michael Gill currently defend a ‘variability thesis’, the view that ordinary moral thought and language contains both cognitivist and non-cognitivist elements.