Consider: (1) If x is morally wrong and S freely does x, then S is blameworthy for doing x. (2) If x is rationally optimal, then S is not blameworthy for freely doing x. (3) Therefore, if x is morally wrong, then x is not […] Read More
I need to help develop an undergraduate course on ethics in journalism and the media, to be taken primarily by aspiring TV/film writers and producers. Have any of our readers ever taught such a course? Anyone willing to share syllabi, advice about texts, etc.? Thanks!
We are pleased to announce that Simon Kirchin has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup. Simon is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Director of Learning and Teaching for the School of European Culture and Languages at the University of […] Read More
I greatly admire the work of Harry Frankfurt. More recently, he has argued that love and caring, in the form of volitional necessities, are the sole source of our practical reasons. One corollary of this is that moral requirements are not important independently of our […] Read More
We are pleased to announce that Simon Keller has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup. Simon is presently a Senior Research Fellow at CAPPE at the University of Melbourne and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Boston University, and he is […] Read More
I’m an editor for Blackwell’s International Encyclopedia of Ethics, and my current (and first) task is to help make sure the IEE will have the right entries, or headwords, for metaethics. Below the fold are the headwords that the über-editors and I came up with […] Read More
Thomas Nadelhoffer, et al. (from the Experimental Philosophy Blog) invite you to take a walk on the other side of experimental philosophy by being part of a survey that will compare/contrast the intuitions of philosophers and non-philosophers on a variety of topics. Follow this link […] Read More
The program for the Madison Metaethics workshop is up. There will be papers by four PEA Soupers: me (Jamie), Mark Schroeder, Jussi Suikkanen, and Stephen Finlay (that’s in order of appearance). Also plenty of other people you love are on the program, and everybody else […] Read More
There are at least two possible ways we might conceive of the too demanding objection: (1) a moral theory is too demanding if it demands more of us than commonsense morality demands of us (that is, if its demands conflict with our commonsense moral intuitions) […] Read More