We are pleased to announce that Thom Brooks has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup. Thom is Reader in Political and Legal Philosophy at the University of Newcastle. He is the founding editor of the Journal of Moral Philosophy and […] Read More
Conference: Human Rights in Theory and Practice Date: Friday, October 3rd, 2008 Location: Rutgers University School of Law-Camden Description: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations in 1948, and in recognition of the UDHR’s 60th anniversary, the Rutgers Institute for […] Read More
First things first. I want to thank Doug, Dave, Dan, and Josh for inviting me to come on as a contributor. I’m interested in connections between reasons for action and belief. For a while, I’ve been content to argue that at a certain high level […] Read More
THIS looks very interesting. The postgraduate students at St Andrews are organising an online reading group on John Broome’s brilliant Weighing Lives book. There’s even a symposium with Broome in October.
The University of Toronto’s Centre for Ethics invites applications for its Visiting Faculty Fellowships. For the academic year 2009-10, two fellowships will be awarded to outstanding scholars and teachers interested in writing and conducting research about ethics during a year in residence at the University […] Read More
Theme: The Ethics of the Family Where: Towson University, Maryland When: November 14-16, 2008 More info: http://www.rit.edu/cla/ethics/seac/conferences.html
The "recognitional view" of practical rationality – as I shall use the term – is the view that all requirements of practical rationality are justified by the fact that it is reasonable to expect one’s conforming to these requirements to lead to one’s practical reasoning’s […] Read More
We are pleased to announce the addition of two new contributors to PEA Soup: Clayton Littlejohn and Jason Raibley. Clayton is a Lecturer at Southern Methodist University. He specializes in epistemology, ethical theory, and philosophy of mind, and he has papers forthcoming in the Philosophical […] Read More
I’m sympathetic to the following view, which I call moral rationalism: MR: If S is morally required to do x, then S has decisive reason (all things considered) to do x. One popular argument for this view appeals to blameworthiness. This sort of argument is […] Read More