Russ has released the program for the 2009 Madison Metaethics Workshop. Needless to say, it looks good.
Perhaps three isn't too many, but it does feel unwieldy. Nevertheless, it seems to me these are all different distinctions in value, even though many people write as if they are the same: 1. Extrinsic-intrinsic 2. Conditional-unconditional 3. Priceable-priceless Whether something has extrinsic or intrinsic […] Read More
First, thanks to Doug and the other editors for the invitation! I'm happy to be here. For my first post, I wanted to share an issue that has been puzzling me. Ultimately, this relates back to issues in voting ethics, but I want to submit […] Read More
We're pleased to announce that Jason Brennan has accepted our invitation to become a contributor. Here's a brief biography, which I borrow from his web site: "JASON BRENNAN (Ph.D., 2007, University of Arizona) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Research, at Brown University, and a member […] Read More
Thanks to everyone for sharing their intuitions about the cases in my previous post. Here I’m going to back up and say something about my interest in the cases. Among linguists, the canonical view about modal expressions like “might”, “may” and “must” is that they […] Read More
I’ve just been reading Christine Korsgaard’s new book Self-Constitution – Agency, Identity, and Integrity. It’s a marvelous book, one of the best I’ve read in long time. It presents an appealing picture of actions, agency, practical deliberation, normativity, morality, and interpersonal relations, it draws from […] Read More
… returns, thanks to Simon Rippon. You can find the feed link in the top Navigation Bar. Thank you, Simon, for getting this global comments feed back up and running for us!
My most compelling intuition is that the effective freedom to achieve a state I could want, even if I don't actually want it, makes me better off so that even if I don't actually want something I'm still worse off for not being able to […] Read More
Right now I’m thinking about the proper descriptive semantics for bare, normative modal statements, statements that use expressions like “must”, “ought”, and “may” normatively but don’t contain explicit restrictor phrases like “legally”, “morally”, or “given what I know”. I’m developing my own account of their […] Read More