At the end of this month, I am due to respond to Brian Leiter's essay "Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche", on the National Humanities Center's web site On the Human. In this essay, Leiter develops a Nietzsche-inspired argument, according to which moral scepticism […] Read More
As most of you know, Daniel Star and Stephen Kearns have recently made an interesting, original proposal of what reasons are generally speaking (see, for instance, their ‘Reasons as Evidence’ in OSME 4).On their view, to be a reason is to be evidence for an […] Read More
We are pleased to announce that Jeremy Fantl has accepted our invitation to be a contributor at PEA Soup. Jeremy is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary and specializes in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and mind. Welcome Jeremy!
Those of you who are or will be in the UK in a few weeks may be interested in this conference on psychopathy and amorality to be held in Swansea, March 26-27.
The Department of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research is pleased to announce a conference on varieties of ethical skepticism, to be held this April 16th and 17th in New York City. The speakers are Michael Gill, Peter Kail, Jessica Berry, Mark Richard, […] Read More
Nathan Nobis writes: I have created a survey to try to identify which topics are most commonly addressed in introductory ethics courses that have a contemporary moral issues or problems component. If (and only if) you teach a course that focuses on practical issues (with […] Read More
We are pleased to announce that Matt McGrath, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri-Columbia, has accepted our invitation to be a contributor here in the Soup! Matt focuses on issues in epistemology and metaphysics, including how these issues relate to the objectivity […] Read More
Moral epistemology is an area of metaethics that I feel most uneasy about. I’ve done the least research in this area, and I’m never quite happy with what I read. However, I have tried to get at least started. So, this post is a Groundwork […] Read More
In a couple of conversations that I’ve had recently, I’ve been surprised to find that several moral philosophers believe that when we are morally obliged to do an act, this “act” that we’re obliged to do is an act-token, not an act-type. In my view, […] Read More