Let us define objective consequentialism and subjective consequentialism, respectively, as follows: OC: S’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and because, there is no alternative that would produce more value than x would. SC: S’s performing x is morally permissible if and […] Read More
We are pleased to announce that Matt Bedke has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup. Matt is Assistant Professor at the University of British Columbia and specializes in ethics and normativity, with additional interests in philosophy of law and social […] Read More
If you will be in the NYC area on May 1st, consider going to this conference; looks like fun! ** Experimental Philosophy and Meta-ethics ** A series of recent experimental studies have examined people's intuitions about meta-ethical issues. Participants in this workshop will discuss the […] Read More
PeaSoupers may be interested to read a series of essays sponsored by the Templeton Foundation on the question, "Does Moral Action Depend on Reasoning?" Al Mele, Joshua Greene, and Christine Korsgaard contribute, as well as several other philosophy-ish intellectuals, neuroscientists, etc.
In Nature, psychologist Paul Bloom has published a short rejoinder to 'social intuitionist' claims that rational deliberation has no role in shaping our moral convictions. His chief argument is that evolved emotional responses cannot explain how our moral sympathies change. A taste below the fold:
We're very pleased to welcome Daniel Star as a contributor to PEA Soup. Daniel received his D.Phil. at Oxford and is currently an assistant professor of philosophy at Boston University, specializing in ethical theory, metaethics, epistemology, and the history of ethics. Glad to have you […] Read More
One objection to Humean views about motivation, and to the 'Standard Model' of intention on which intentions are complexes of desire and belief, is that these views don't allow agents to choose their reasons for doing some action. In Reasons Without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya presents […] Read More
Brian Leiter has posted a short essay developing a Nietzschean argument for moral scepticism on the web site of the National Humanities Center On the Human. There are also replies to Leiter’s Nietzschean argument by me and by Paul Katsafanas; there will soon be a […] Read More
Mark Timmons writes: "I am pleased to announce a call for abstracts for the Second Annual Arizona Workshop on Normative Ethical Theory that will be held in Tucson, Arizona on January 6-8, 2011. Abstracts are welcome in any area or on any topic in normative […] Read More