I'm reading Wedgwood's discussion of Normative Judgement Internalism (NJI), which has prompted me to think the following:
Philosophers often refer to all-things-considered judgments about what one ought to do. But this concept is underanalyzed. I venture that almost no one who uses this term actually has a clear idea about what it means. *What* exactly are you judging if you judge that, all things considered, you ought to V?
It is important to clarify this because otherwise it is impossible to assess adequately the claim that there is an internal connection of some sort between 1) making an all things considered judgment that you ought to V and 2) intending to V. The plausibility of NJI rests, then, upon the specification of these ATC-ought judgments.
Several distinct possibilities emerge. Here are a few, with increasing stringency:
- Based upon everything I am now considering, I ought to V. (O1)
- Based upon everything I have considered, I ought to V. (O2)
- Based upon everything I ought to consider, I ought to V. (O3)
- Based upon all relevant considerations, I ought to V. (O4)
- Based upon all things that I could consider, I ought to V. (O5)
- Based upon all considerations, I ought to V. (O6)
All of these specifications of ATC judgments are to be distinguished from:
- Based upon moral considerations, I ought to V. (In other words, I morally ought to V.)
- Based upon moral and prudential considerations, I ought to V.
- Based upon moral and prudential and aesthetic considerations, I ought to V.
- Based upon moral and prudential and aesthetic and legal considerations (and so on), I ought to V.
Further, they are to be distinguished from: I ought to V. For it seems possible to judge that I ought to V without making any of the above judgments.
Now begin with O1. It is highly implausible that judging O1 rationally commits me to intending to V. Judging O1, I might also accurately realize that I am not considering enough things to make up my mind about whether to V. O2 is not significantly different in this respect.
O3 seems to be a more promising candidate for NJI. But we must ask about the nature of the first "ought" in O3. Is it too an all-things-considered "ought"? Regress problems emerge.
The problem with O4-O6, I suspect, is not that philosophers can't find some connection between making these judgments and intention. Rather, the problem is that people rarely if ever make these judgments. Who in their right mind thinks that they have considered *everything* that is relevant, *everything* that it is possible for them to consider, or *everything* that anyone could consider? The "all" in these judgments means "all". And so, it would be wise never to make them. Or at least, almost never. Only an over-intellectualist fantasy (or simplistic examples) could mislead us to think otherwise.
So, what other way(s) of specifying ATC judgments could rescue NJI, such that it is both plausible and interesting?