I'm really enjoying Scanlon's new book "Being Realistic About Reasons" (all citations below to this book), but I'm stumbling on the part about pure normative truths and the explanation of supervenience. Any help would be much appreciated.
Just a quick reminder that our next Ethics discussion, on Peter Railton's "The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement," takes place on August 4-6. Railton's article is available open access here. The discussion will start with a critical précis by Bryce Huebner. Join us […] Read More
Happy Bastille Day! One more post for N and M month. Some Kantians make a lot of the fact that often, when we are being moral, we don’t feel like we want to do the right thing, but we do it. Korsgaard openly ridicules the […] Read More
I was asked to post the following call for papers for a climate change ethics conference that looks very interesting. This is a workshop in Helsinki, Finland (the good old days…) from 11th to 13th of November, 2014. The confirmed keynotes are John Broome (Oxford) […] Read More
See here for the new issue. JPE is an open access journal.
In my previous post, I argued that there are state-given reasons not to believe certain propositions. In this post, I shall argue that there are also state-given reasons both for and against intending.
According to a common view, the difference between the “right” kind of reasons that support the distinctive rationality of belief, intention, or other attitudes, and the “wrong” kind of reasons that do not, is that the former are “object-given” reasons while the latter are “state-given” […] Read More
This is definitely work in progress, if you can call it that. Tim Schroeder and I have defended a view according to which even though virtuous people seem different from the rest of us in many ways, it basically comes down to a difference in […] Read More
If your FIRST name starts with M or N, July is your special month to shine on the Soup. See Instructions for Contributors.