A forum for discussing Philosophy, Ethics, and Academia
and I welcome you to the discussion of Gerald (Jerry) Gaus‘s recent “Self-Organizing Moral Systems: Beyond Social Contract Theory” (also available here). To kick off the discussion, we have a précis from Jeppe von Platz and reply from Gaus. Please join us in the discussion! […] Read More
Here. Looks like another tasty one.
I greatly enjoyed reading Youngsun Back’s intriguing paper, ‘Are animals moral?: Zhu Xi and Jeong Yakyong’s views on nonhuman animals’. Back discusses the views of two philosopher’s, Zhu Xi and Jeong Yakyong (aka Dasan), and draws some parallels, and points of difference, between views I […] Read More
[Our last contribution to Agency & Responsibility October comes from Rachel Fredericks and Jeremy Fischer. Take it away, folks!] Central to the experience of the victims of many serious crimes and moral wrongs is feeling that the perpetrator is creepy as hell. But moral psychologists […] Read More
Are you interested in questions about whether non-human animals can be moral and about how answers to that bear on questions about moral status? Are you interested in learning about Confucian debates on these topics? If you answer yes to either question, please click on […] Read More
Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting and productive discussion of Samuel Asarnow‘s “Internal Reasons and the Boy Who Cried Wolf.” The paper is published in the most recent issue of Ethics, and is available here. Ulf Hlobil has kindly agreed to contribute a critical […] Read More
[Yet another installment of Agency and Responsibility October, by Polaris Koi (University of Turku). Take it away, Polaris!] Strawson (1962) divides pleas for mitigated responsibility in two groups. The first group consists in agential pleas, in which the agent is excused or blame is mitigated […] Read More
[Another contribution to Agency & Responsibility October, this one by Marcela Herdova. Take it away, Marcela!] What is doing the work in manipulation cases, i.e. what is pushing the intuitions that the agents in these cases are not free/not responsible? Consider the following version of […] Read More
[Our next guest installment for Agency & Responsibility October, from Taylor Cyr (Samford). Take it away, Taylor!] Many of our ordinary moral judgments and practices presuppose that there can be moral luck—cases in which two agents differ in blameworthiness despite the differences between them being […] Read More