The 2005 Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference is on Time and Identity. There will be a panel discussion on death featuring Harry Silverstein, Barbara Levenbook and me. I’ll post an update when the program is up.
I’m happy to report what looks to be a terrific conference coming up this Saturday, February 26, at UC Riverside, on the work of Gary Watson (timed in rough relation to the publication of his book Agency and Answerability). Follow this link for more details: […] Read More
In case you haven’t heard yet, Peter Unger, the author of Living High and Letting Die, has put six of the ten chapters of his forthcoming book All the Power in the World on his website. The book is forthcoming with OUP.
In his classic paper “Moral luck,” Thomas Nagel claims that Kant denied the relevance of moral luck (i.e., Kant denied that any factor outside an agent’s control should determine how we morally appraise an agent or her actions), and that the explanation of Kant’s denial […] Read More
I’m pleased to announce that there will be a moral phenomenology workshop at the University of Arizona this coming November. See the following link: www.moralphenomenology.com. Lots of good folks will be there, and it will be exciting to be in on the ground floor of […] Read More
I just wanted to alert people to two forthcoming ethics conferences that feature some excellent topics and speakers.
Do you want to embarrass a subjectivist about practical reason or well-being? C’mon, you know you do. Well then, all you have to do is ask them if the heroes they so eagerly cite as motivating and explicating and defending subjectivist accounts are themselves subjectivists. […] Read More
This post over at E.G. got me thinking. E.G. writes: "Consider two demands: 1. A moral theory must be able to accommodate many or most of our deeply-held, commonsense intuitions. If a moral theory tells us to do something we feel strongly we ought not […] Read More
In a recent article, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen presents an argument against “real self” views of autonomy and responsibility that, on its face, seems fairly troublesome ("Identification and Responsibility," in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2003): 349-376). Real self views are those that maintain that one […] Read More