It seems to me that there are not only reasons for action, but also reasons for belief and even reasons for having certain feelings and attitudes. But even if you don’t accept that there are non-instrumental normative reasons to want something or to prefer one […] Read More
If there are moral experts, this would seem to have important implications for a number of issues in philosophical ethics. So who is a moral expert? Here are some thoughts of my own. [1] A moral expert is someone to whom one could go for […] Read More
If (like me) you think that it’s more important to making the world a better place that people pay attention to the right things (rather than, say, that they hold the right beliefs), then you have to be struck by the differential in media attention […] Read More
Studies in the History of Ethics, a web-based, peer-reviewed journal dedicated to publishing high quality research and reviews in the history of ethics, announces a special call for papers for a symposium to be published in spring 2006. TOPIC: The Ethics of War and Peace […] Read More
Josh Dever is working on a Philosophy Family Tree. He has a new blog where he is collecting information. If you aren’t on the tree, you’re not really a philosopher, so check it out and get yourself on the tree!
Following our earlier discussion about the merits of particularism comes this review by Timonthy Chappell of Jonathan Dancy’s new book, Ethics Without Principles. Book reviewing, I’ve learned, is a genuine art, and this review is a rare achievement: biting, funny, and informative. Check it out!
A call for papers is out for a workshop on moral psychology and moral judgment in Helsinki in December. The invited speakers are Simon Blackburn and Jonathan Dancy, and the deadline for submissions is September 15. Thanks to Jussi Suikkanen for the pointer.
In a very nicely constructed recent paper (“Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from ‘acquired sociopathy’”, Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003),) Adina Roskies offers a compelling argument against the position she dubs “motive internalism” (others have called it “belief internalism” or “judgment internalism”). Motive internalism states: […] Read More
A Conference at Bowling Green State University April 7-9, 2006