In his new book, Moral Value and Human Diversity, Robert Audi introduces a brand-new ethical theory called pluralist universalism. It is not altogether new but rather an original collage of some of the existing ethical theories. He doesn’t much argue for the view or explain […] Read More
Jimmy Lenman writes: Further to Jussi’s note about BSET 2007, the BSET website to which he offers a link is a bit temperamental at the minute (we are on the case and hope to fix it before long). So for detailed information, booking form etc. […] Read More
In his wonderful MORAL FICTIONALISM, which I’ve just happily read, Mark Kalderon defends a very interesting metaethical view. Kalderon holds two positions that are not usually conjoined. But I am not sure they can both be coherently held, although I don’t know whether I can […] Read More
What was later called expressivism about ethics, and what we can call Wittgensteinian approaches to religion, had their origin in the same place: empiricist theories of meaning, which ruled out from “descriptive” discourse anything that was not empirically verifiable. In both cases, not everybody was […] Read More
The excellent line-up of speakers for the 2007 BSET conference is now HERE . The conference is in Bristol on 9.-11. of July. This is going to be yet another cracking event and so I hope that as many of you as possible can attend. […] Read More
Welfare Egalitarianism (hereafter, Egalitarianism) is the view that it is intrinsically good for people to be equally well off. Or more generally: it is intrinsically better for people to be more nearly equal in welfare. Survey question for curiosity: how many readers think that’s true? […] Read More
For a very long time, many philosophers thought that knowledge is justified true belief. But Gettier pointed out how one can have justified true belief and yet lack knowledge. For a very long time, many philosophers have thought that performing a virtuous action is performing […] Read More
Many philosophers want to use desires to account for rationality, reasons, well-being, and so on. Few of them use actual desires in this project. This is because actual desires are often ill-informed. In some cases, had we known better we would not have desired to […] Read More
We’re pleased to announce the addition of Jamie Dreier to the list of contributors. Jamie has, from the beginning, been an extremely valuable commentator here at PEA Soup. We’re very glad that he’s now decided to post as well—see below. Jamie is a Professor of […] Read More