Reasons are facts that count in favor of some intentional attitude, such as a belief, a desire, or an intention to act. And reasons to A (where ‘A’ stands for some intentional attitude) can be divided into two subcategories. First, there are those reasons to […] Read More
I had a conversation earlier this year with a faculty member who was recently appointed to emeritus status at a research university, a story that says a lot about the research climate in philosophy then and now.
Via Don Tontiplaphol, a call for papers: Harvard UniversityGraduate Student Conference in Political TheoryNov. 30 – Dec. 1, 2007 Details below the fold…
When I first met Jonathan Dancy three years ago, I remember him mentioning the early emotivist papers in Analysis. One night year and a half ago, I was working at the library and things weren’t really going anywhere so I thought I’d check those out. […] Read More
Greetings, all. Sorry that my first official post will be so mundane, but here goes. I’ll be teaching an upper-level undergraduate course in metaethics for the first time this fall. I’m wondering if anyone who has taught metaethics at this level can recommend an anthology […] Read More
CALL FOR PAPERSTHE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL THEORY2008 CONFERENCEUniversity of Edinburgh, UK14-16th July 2008Invited Speakers: Barbara Herman (UCLA), Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund)Papers are invited for the annual conference of the British Society for EthicalTheory, to be held at the University of Edinburgh. The subject area is […] Read More
File this under “meta-meta-ethics” Don Loeb and Michael Gill currently defend a ‘variability thesis’, the view that ordinary moral thought and language contains both cognitivist and non-cognitivist elements.
PEA Soup readers may be interested in this conference on Agency. Agency at the Intersection We are pleased to announce the 2007 Conference on Agency and Responsibility, to be held at Indiana University, Bloomington on September 13-15, 2007.
It is often supposed that people are not morally responsible for their behavior when that behavior is the product of non-culpable ignorance, but the issue becomes considerably more complex when the ignorance in question is concerned only with moral truths. Suppose that an agent knows […] Read More