Many Kantians have reservations about Kant’s rather strident view concerning self-killing. In the Lectures on Ethics in particular, Kant’s rhetoric pulls no moral punches. Kant calls suicide "revolting", an act wherein we reduce ourselves to mere "carrion" with "no intrinsic worth." We ought to "shrink […] Read More
Today marks the third anniversary of PEA Soup’s burst (okay, limp) onto the blogosphere. We’re celebrating with a new look, about which we’ll say a bit more below. But first, right up front, we want to thank all of you—our fellow contributors, commentators, and readers—for helping to […] Read More
I wanted to follow up on Jimmy Lenman’s suggestion in a recent discussion thread that there is something harder for expressivists about accounting for negation than about accounting for conjunction. I’d like to try explaining why I think that is not the case. Jimmy describes […] Read More
The roster continues to grow in quantity and quality. Over the past two days, we were pleased to announce that Jimmy Lenman and Sally Haslanger have agreed to contribute to PEA Soup, and we are now pleased to announce that Mark Schroeder has also accepted […] Read More
We’re very pleased to announce the addition of Sally Haslanger to PEA Soup’s roster of contributors. Sally is a Professor in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT and is affiliated with MIT’s Women’s Studies Program. Among her many contributions to the profession, she […] Read More
Via Russ Shafer-Landau: The program for the 4th Annual Metaethics Workshop (Sept 7-9, 2007) has been finalized. It is available (with much other relevant information) on the Workshop’s website: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/info/2007/Metaethics_Workshop/ Papers for the workshop will be posted on the website at some point during the […] Read More
We are pleased to announce that Jimmy Lenman, a regular commentator on PEA Soup, has accepted our invitation to be contributor here at PEA Soup. Most of you know that Jimmy is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, President of the British Society […] Read More
Reasons are facts that count in favor of some intentional attitude, such as a belief, a desire, or an intention to act. And reasons to A (where ‘A’ stands for some intentional attitude) can be divided into two subcategories. First, there are those reasons to […] Read More
I had a conversation earlier this year with a faculty member who was recently appointed to emeritus status at a research university, a story that says a lot about the research climate in philosophy then and now.