The Department of Philosophy of the University of Sheffield supported by theArts and Humanities Research Council will be hosting a series of events in 2009devoted to the theme of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. 7th February 2009Workshop: Constructivism in Political PhilosophySpeakersKirsten Budde (University of Sheffield)Aaron James […] Read More
As we all know, J. S. Mill claims that pleasures differ from each other, not only in quantity, but also in quality. Many commentators have read Mill as making the following two claims: Pleasures fall into two disjoint categories — the "higher" pleasures and the […] Read More
I am reviewing (our own) Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the Passions for Ethics. As the advance praise from Michael Smith and Stephen Darwall indicates, anyone interested in reasons and rationality will profit from reading this book. In the book, Schroeder defends a novel Humean theory […] Read More
Let me be the first PEA Souper to follow the blogging trend of linking to FAILBlog, and direct you to this real-life instance of the toxin puzzle.
David Faraci, from Bowling Green State University, has asked me to run the following post on his behalf (he’ll be responding to comments directly): I want to argue that expressivism is incapable of making sense of certain kinds of nihilistic utterances. Much of this argument […] Read More
I’ve been recently reading Gibbard’s and Schroeder’s new books (both brilliant) on expressivism. I’ve started to wonder whether there is a connection between expressivism and the so-called buck-passing views. I’m sure others have thought about this before, but, if there is such a connection, it […] Read More
Eric Schwitzgebel and Fiery Cushman are running a new version of the Moral Sense Test and they are especially interested in collecting responses from moral experts – those with graduate training in ethical or political theory. Given the readership of this Blog, that probably includes […] Read More
Judgment internalism (which holds that a necessary condition on a judgment of the form “x has reason to y”, when stated by x, is that x have some motivation to y) is often used as a crucial plank in arguments for noncognitivism. Very roughly speaking, […] Read More
Steve Campbell from Michigan kindly directed my attention to a new paper that uses the methods of experimental philosophy to investigate the objectivity-question in metaethics. This paper by Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley is entitled ‘The Psychology of Metaethics: Exploring Objectivism’ (downloadable from HERE). I […] Read More