Moral luck obtains wherever the moral evaluation of an agent is affected by circumstances beyond that agent’s control. But the judgment that the moral evaluation […] Read More
Category: Discussions
Expressivism holds that moral judgments are, at least in part, expressions (in some appropriate sense of ‘express’) of pro- or con-attitudes. Since it is typically […] Read More
In a recent review essay, “Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics“, David Copp and PEA Soup’s own David Sobel […] Read More
Mackie’s queerness argument (QA), in its metaphysical part, goes something like this. Putative facts about our moral obligations supposedly involve objective values that carry normativity […] Read More
A number of philosophers have argued that there can be actions that are at one and the same time immoral and admirable. These philosophers sometimes […] Read More
Recent attempts to revive the Platonic thesis that moral knowledge is innate have attempted to piggy-back on the perceived success of the Chomskian arguments for […] Read More
I’ve recently found myself having to deal more and more with the gnarly issue of souls in my work. My research focuses primarily on the […] Read More
Ronald Dworkin argues, in two lengthy papers (“What is Equality? Parts 1 and 2”, P&PA 1981), that, if we care about equality at all, then […] Read More
Ever come across an argument that you just know can’t be right but you can’t pin down its flaw? I had that experience recently while […] Read More