A question for those better tutored in (or perhaps more sympathetic to) consequentialism than I: How are we to understand the claim that consequentialists count […] Read More
Category: Discussions
Here’s what Scanlon says: “the purely teleological conception of reasons…[holds that,] since any rational action must aim at some result, reasons that bear on whether […] Read More
In his “Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism” (Philosophical Perspectives 18: 23-44), James Dreier poses an urgent question. (Well, as urgent as questions in […] Read More
The following is a Pareto principle that concerns reasons for actions as opposed to the standard preferences for outcomes. I call it The Pareto Reasons […] Read More
This marks the eighth of eleven e-meetings of our virtual reading group on Derek Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain—see here for further details. Next week, we […] Read More
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and I are running a series of experimental studies on the doing/allowing distinction, and we’d love to have your input on some of […] Read More
This marks the seventh of eleven e-meetings of our virtual reading group on Derek Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain—see here for further details. Next week, we […] Read More
(This marks the sixth of eleven "meetings" of our virtual reading group on Derek Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain—see here for further details. Next week, we […] Read More
I interrupt our regularly scheduled programming to ask whether the following objection to consequentialism is at all original: (Given the vast literature on consequentialism, I […] Read More