In his new book, Moral Value and Human Diversity, Robert Audi introduces a brand-new ethical theory called pluralist universalism. It is not altogether new but […] Read More
Category: Normative Ethics
Welfare Egalitarianism (hereafter, Egalitarianism) is the view that it is intrinsically good for people to be equally well off. Or more generally: it is intrinsically […] Read More
In her very good article in the latest Ethics (117, Oct. ’06), “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances,” Tamar Schapiro brings to light a problem with […] Read More
A lot of moral theorists are sceptics about Act Consequentialism (AC). For example, some of these sceptics think that we need to qualify AC with […] Read More
Consider the following passage from Scanlon: [B]eing good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing […] Read More
Something has always bothered me about Parfit’s treatment of Scanlon’s contractualism both in his "Justifiability to Each Other" and in the new Climbing the Mountain. […] Read More
In “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” Scanlon introduces what he calls “philosophical utilitarianism” (PU). PU is the view that “the only fundamental moral facts are facts about individual […] Read More
As everyone knows, I ‘Reealy’ like Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other. One good thing about the book is that every time you read […] Read More
Lately I’ve been thinking about taxonomy of philosophical views, especially in the area of normative ethics. Here’s a fragment of a common taxonomy of ethical […] Read More