Category: Metaethics

This is the sixth of a series of posts in which I try to make clear the different embedding difficulties that, as a family, are […] Read More

In his recent Moral Realism: A Defence, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that “moral facts are themselves intrinsically reason-giving, i.e. supply reasons for action regardless of the […] Read More

Been a little slow here at the Soup, so I thought I’d let you know a little about what I’ve been reading, namely, Hilary Putnam’s […] Read More

Expressivism holds that moral judgments are, at least in part, expressions (in some appropriate sense of ‘express’) of pro- or con-attitudes. Since it is typically […] Read More

Mackie’s queerness argument (QA), in its metaphysical part, goes something like this. Putative facts about our moral obligations supposedly involve objective values that carry normativity […] Read More

Recent attempts to revive the Platonic thesis that moral knowledge is innate have attempted to piggy-back on the perceived success of the Chomskian arguments for […] Read More

This is the fifth of a series of posts about the different embedding difficulties that, as a family, are thought to present the most pressing […] Read More