Expressivism, or more generally moral anti-realism, is an area of tremendous philosophical endeavor these days, despite being counterintuitive to plain persons and a research program […] Read More
Category: Metaethics
Advocates of moral dilemmas claim that there are possible cases in which no action open to an agent is morally permissible. If we translated this […] Read More
As we all know saving the differences is difficult. Distinguishing between realists and anti-realists is coming increasingly difficult. For me, this is a fascinating topic. […] Read More
Sometimes you wonder whether your own philosophical convictions block your ability to fairly evaluate the arguments of others. In my case, my anti-relativism is one […] Read More
There is an intuitionistic view in Metaethics that is often ridiculed (Mackie is a good laugh at this point, so is Blackburn). Already for that […] Read More
Normative theories are occasionally criticized for being esoteric. A theory T is esoteric iff (T is true (or correct, or superior to its rivals, etc.), […] Read More
My previous formulation of TCR, left something to be desired. Here’s what I hope is a better formulation: TCR: (1) S has better reason to […] Read More
Here’s what Scanlon says: “the purely teleological conception of reasons…[holds that,] since any rational action must aim at some result, reasons that bear on whether […] Read More
In his “Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism” (Philosophical Perspectives 18: 23-44), James Dreier poses an urgent question. (Well, as urgent as questions in […] Read More