In “Oughts, Options, and Actualism” (Philosophical Review 1986), Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter defended the “actualist” view that, for every act-type A, you ought to […] Read More
Category: Metaethics
Workshop: "Naturalism: Ethical and Metaphysical"University of LeedsSeptember 18-19, 2009 This workshop brings together researchers interested in issues concerning naturalism in moral philosophy and in metaphysics […] Read More
One thing I’ve become much more aware of in Leeds is the distinction between semantics and metasemantics. There is a worry that ignoring this distinction is creating […] Read More
One of the more serious attempts to provide an expressivist semantics for moral terms (broadly construed) is Gibbard’s. The basic idea is that they express […] Read More
Russ has released the program for the 2009 Madison Metaethics Workshop. Needless to say, it looks good.
Thanks to everyone for sharing their intuitions about the cases in my previous post. Here I’m going to back up and say something about my […] Read More
I’ve just been reading Christine Korsgaard’s new book Self-Constitution – Agency, Identity, and Integrity. It’s a marvelous book, one of the best I’ve read in […] Read More
Right now I’m thinking about the proper descriptive semantics for bare, normative modal statements, statements that use expressions like “must”, “ought”, and “may” normatively but […] Read More
The distinction between the 'right' and 'wrong' kind of reasons is taken to play at least three important roles: 'right' kind but not 'wrong' kinds […] Read More