
What fundamentally exemplifies the property of practical rationality? According to atomism, it is fundamentally each particular intention that an agent might have at a time […] Read More
What fundamentally exemplifies the property of practical rationality? According to atomism, it is fundamentally each particular intention that an agent might have at a time […] Read More
In a famous passage in What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon introduced a case where we have to choose between saving one person […] Read More
Chap. 2 of J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism is widely interpreted as defending qualitative hedonism, as a view about the nature of personal well-being. On views of […] Read More
Undoubtedly, philosophers do make moral judgments about particular cases. For example, they make judgments about actual historical cases – as G.E.M. Anscombe famously judged that […] Read More
Most contemporary work in population ethics operates within the framework of welfarism – the assumption that individual welfare is the fundamental value. But this framework is […] Read More
In this post, I shall argue for the conclusion that there is no such thing as moral vagueness. The argument rests on a certain assumption, […] Read More
Both Hume and Kant advocated extreme and implausible views of motivation; the same is also true of many of their contemporary followers. The truth about […] Read More
Suppose that there is both an objective ‘ought’ and a subjective ‘ought’. Which of these two kinds of ‘ought’ figures in the anti-akrasia principle that […] Read More
Some philosophers – let’s call them “teleologists” – believe that there is an intimate connection between deontic terms like ‘required’, ‘ought’, and ‘permissible’, on the one hand, […] Read More