In this edition of PEA Soup’s public philosophy section, ‘Soup of the Day’, Achas Burin (Warwick) discusses the uses and misuses of philosophical work in the courtroom, responding to a recent piece by David Enoch (Oxford) on the judicial ‘temptation’ to look to philosophy for answers to legal problems.
Please do get involved in the discussion in the comments below.
Over to Achas.
Courts’ use of philosophical work
In law, the word ‘academic’ is, if not a dismissive epithet outright, an adjective which means that an issue has no practical importance. For example, the official Guide to the UK’s Administrative Court says that a court case may not be brought, or continued, when it is academic.[1] The Guide synthesises previous case-law. Recently, the use of academic work in courts has received attention from philosophers. David Enoch, in an inaugural lecture, has done his best to dissuade judges from using philosophy.[2] Enoch suggests that there is an ‘import temptation’, i.e. a temptation on the part of judges to resort to philosophy for answers; he advises that they keep such an instinct at bay.
I have my doubts whether such a temptation exists, at least in the unvarnished way he suggests. It is useful to understand why and how judges use philosophical argument. This may be difficult for academic philosophers, some of whom may have little familiarity with law. So this blog post provides some context for those philosophers. I will be drawing on one example of a court’s use of academic philosophy by John Gardner. In so doing, I will give a short critique of Enoch’s central arguments in the inaugural lecture – at least as they apply to judges. To be sure, Enoch is also castigating professional academics, but I will put his advice to academics aside for the purpose of this blog post. While it is not inapt to worry about the craft of judging, this blog argues that philosophy of any kind may be resorted to if the court is asking the same question as the philosophical work.
David Enoch’s inaugural lecture: summary and commentary
In his inaugural lecture entitled ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’, David Enoch said this:
Suppose you are a judge—say, in an appellate court […]—about to decide a case. Your decision will, as many such decisions do, have real effects on the lives of real people. […] But now suppose that your clerk comes along with breaking news from the epistemology seminar room. […] Can you imagine any situation in which the news from the epistemology seminar room—about the nature of knowledge, or evidence—somehow generates reasons for deciding in one way that outweigh any of the practical considerations […]? To me, this sounds both descriptively and normatively ridiculous. Descriptively, I find it very hard to believe that any judge has ever been affected in this kind of way by the breaking news from the epistemology seminar room. […] Normatively, […] [n]o good judge is willing to let philosophical niceties…all by themselves, affect a decision that affects the lives of real people.[3]
This is correct because it is a caricature. As a description of both legal and philosophical practice, it is unreal. (Are philosophical discoveries made in seminar rooms in the same way as scientific discoveries are made in laboratories? Do law clerks run out of philosophy seminar rooms shouting ‘Eureka!’?) I am not anti-humour in academic work but it is sometimes misplaced, such that it distorts the argument. As I go on to explain, the ways in which philosophical work comes to courts’ attention matters – it comes about in the context of an adversarial conflict – so it is unhelpful to start from caricatures. In my view, good philosophy starts from accurate descriptions.
To return to the quote, I agree with Enoch that it is simply unlikely a judge’s balance of reasons would be decisively affected by the introduction of a philosophical idea. The courts’ use of the descriptor ‘academic’ – as discussed immediately above – shows that judges are alive to the practical importance, if any, of the considerations that go into their judg(e)ments. The Administrative Court Guide is far from being the only example that can be provided. To take another example, the judgment in Connolly v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority states: ‘It is not my intention in this judgment to seek to contribute to the wealth of learning on this subject or to turn my judgment into a sort of…article on this subject.’[4]
Of course, Enoch must therefore explain why he thinks there exists an import temptation. He asserts that ‘there is the temptation to import the metaphysicians’ lessons into legal theory, and indeed to the law’ because ‘metaphysicians are typically much better than lawyers, and indeed than legal theorists’[5] at issues of causation, epistemology, and so on. His argument that philosophers are ‘better’ and their work more ‘impressive’ suggests the temptation is driven by a shared quality standard. Below, I explain why this may not be the case. Very often, judges are pursuing wholly different projects to philosophers. As their aims are different, so are their success criteria – therefore the ‘import temptation’ may not be as tempting as Enoch assumes. Much will depend on the palate of the particular court in question, and the legal culture more widely of the country in question.
Being realistic, there is a role for philosophical work in law and Enoch acknowledges it. He allows that philosophers can contribute by generating new ideas, exposing bad legal theorising and debunking doctrines or practices.[6] There is little to disagree with there. Indeed, it can be positively argued that courts can sometimes derive assistance from work in metaphysics or epistemology – in the area of causation, for example, where courts have abandoned the ‘but for’ test in certain circumstances. The extensive debates in philosophy about alternatives to this test may well be useful to courts.
The part of the lecture which seems to me most awkward is a section addressing what Enoch calls ‘the natural language objection’. The objection is as follows: if both lawyers and philosophers speak of ordinary language terms such as “knowledge”, “causation” and “intention”, why should not philosophical conclusions be imported directly into law?[7] The oddity in this objection is that it locates the rationale for using philosophical work in language itself. Probably what Enoch meant was that ordinary words refer to ordinary concepts. Indeed Enoch’s targets, including Hart and Honoré[8] in their famous book on causation, can be characterised as arguing that law uses quotidian concepts of causation, not simply quotidian words. However, if this is what Enoch meant, then the discussion in the lecture is overfocused on language rather than concepts. For example, it is not obvious that anyone would suggest that it followed from the use of natural language that philosophical conclusions can be imported directly into law. Some further premise would be required to show that ordinary concepts can be imported directly into law along with philosophical conclusions. Enoch recognises this, and indeed says at the outset of the discussion that the argument seems wrong on its face.[9]
Language, then, is a distraction that leads Enoch to defend some surprising claims. First, he ‘tentatively’ observes that both law and philosophy may utilise meanings that depart from common usage.[10] This is innocuous as a general proposition, but much more would need to be said about whether it obtains in specific cases such as “knowledge”, “causation” and “intention”. On this point, ‘less tentatively’, he says that the cases lawyers and philosophers are interested in are the controversial ones. He says that even if ordinary language settles core cases, it provides little guidance in precisely those situations where legal and philosophical reasoning becomes necessary.[11] This vein of argument seems now to have little to do with concepts, if that is the correct reconstruction of Enoch’s thought. The argument here also devolves into description; it is an empirical question whether most or all controversial legal/philosophical cases involve disputes of meaning – whether they be peripheral meanings rather than core meanings, or natural language rather than technical meanings. (The descriptive point is separate to the political and practical considerations when deciding whether law should track folk concepts.[12])
Enoch then turns from epistemology and metaphysics to moral and political philosophy which, for him, occupy a special position. In the moral and political arena, he accepts that philosophy is not imported from elsewhere; it is often already engaged with the issues law itself confronts. This is part of his broader argument that philosophical conclusions become legally relevant only when auxiliary premises, which he calls bridging principles, link them to law. Enoch has no quarrel with law using philosophical work where there is an appropriate bridging principle as part of a normative argument. His lecture appears, then, ultimately to be an argument about judges using appropriate philosophical methodology. Though it may sound more boring, I would have been interested to hear Enoch engage with this question directly – or even to have addressed existing philosophy on the role of morality/politics in law and judges’ role responsibility. If his interest is in the practical impact of philosophy on law – ‘the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ (as his lecture is titled) – there is much to engage with, even in direct conversation with judges themselves. For example, the UK’s highest court once said:
The court should…exercise its jurisdiction with the utmost restraint, confine itself to deciding whether the proposition of law is erroneous and avoid either expressing ex cathedra opinions in areas of social and ethical controversy in which it has no claim to speak with authority or proffering answers to hypothetical questions of law which do not strictly arise for decision.[13]
Here, the court is agreeing with Enoch that it should be alive foremost to the practical impact of ethical questions, but the court is far less sanguine than Enoch to be considering such issues at all. I, for one, would have been curious to hear Enoch’s reply. But I have another suggestion for a methodological constraint on courts’ use of philosophical work. It is likely that still more methodological constraints could be added. I would be curious to hear them in readers’ comments below. The weight of methodological constraints compared to the old philosophical chestnuts of judges’ role responsibility and the place of pure moral/political argument in judgments (if any) is also ripe for a fuller discussion than Enoch’s lecture permitted.
A further methodological constraint, or citing the wrong John Gardner article
I think it important to be sensitive to how a court gains access to any breaking news from the philosophy seminar room. Most often this comes about because the parties (or, more precisely, the parties’ advocates) put such works in front of the court. They do so for a partisan purpose that equates to a court judgment in their favour. Two things follow from this. First, there is no requirement for a full literature review or other sorts of methodological good practice that we would take for granted if an academic were citing a particular philosophical paper. Second, the court’s use of the philosophical argument will be shaped by the submissions and interpretations of the parties. To put it bluntly, under these conditions, there is no guarantee that courts will accurately appreciate the research in the way the author intended.
An alternative way that academic philosophy might come before a court is as Enoch described, namely if a judicial assistant (or clerk, in the terminology of other jurisdictions) puts something before the judge. More unusual is the academically-inclined judge finding such work for themselves. This is not impossible. Sir Rabinder Singh, an appellate court judge in the UK, has written:
An academic friend of mine once asked me which subjects I had studied at university…had been most useful to me for my practice at the Bar. I replied jurisprudence and legal history – this was only partly tongue in cheek…The specific case law I learnt about has long since become out of date but the structure and principles of law remain of lasting value.[14]
Here is at least one judge admitting that legal philosophy – a subset of moral/political philosophy – is useful sometimes, even just as non-ephemeral background knowledge. But Enoch’s target is, I think, direct reliance on academic philosophy in legal judgments. If a judge or judicial assistant were to seek philosophy out, there is a greater chance that they would read it in the way it was intended – but still not a certainty.
Regardless of how the academic work comes to the court’s attention, it does so in the context of a dispute between two parties. Thus I will suggest that court judgments are rarely engaged in the same project as academic papers. This means the ‘import temptation’ is not always all that tempting. However, if courts do use academic philosophy, I argue that they ought to assure themselves that they are asking the same philosophical question as the paper is answering. Judges’ reasoning sometimes involves taking a position on philosophical debates, either in the conclusion or in premises along the way to a conclusion. Courts will vary in their level of awareness of the philosophical ground on which they are treading. However, the paper they rely on needs to ask the right philosophical question, which may be very different from the legal question(s) that need adjudication before the dispute between the parties can be determined. It is a contingent matter as to whether a court can resolve the legal issue better with or without the assistance of academic research. However, if research is relied on, then at least it needs to be on point.
By way of example, take the UK Supreme Court case of Lewis-Ranwell v G4S.[15] The main issue in the case was whether the claimant, who had killed three people while in a state of psychosis, could get damages for the failure to detain/treat him when he showed signs of mental ill-health prior to the killings. The court cited John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law.[16] In Gardner’s chapter, he divides actions into four categories: (i) actions that are not wrong at all, (ii) actions which are wrong but justified, (iii) actions which are wrong and unjustified but excused, and (iv) actions which are neither justified nor excused but nevertheless not punishable. The Supreme Court judgment characterised the claimant’s actions in that case as falling within the fourth category identified by Gardner. The court then compared this with a work of HLA Hart’s which said insanity was an excuse (i.e. Gardner’s third category). The court tried to get around the disagreement between Hart and Gardner by pointing out the common ground between them, which is that insanity is not a justification.
It is not entirely clear to me why the court felt it necessary to embark on this exercise at all, save that the parties’ arguments sometimes touched on the morality and sometimes the legality of the claimant’s action. Troublingly for the methodological constraint that I am advocating, John Gardner himself would have said that there was a prior philosophical issue. Responsibility in criminal law, Gardner thought, took its moral importance from its relationship with a more basic sense of responsibility.[17] He would have held that an insane claimant lacked basic responsibility,[18] rendering the justification/excuse question a red herring. However, the Supreme Court did not refer to Gardner’s work on responsibility, or clearly separate the responsibility issue from the action issue. The Supreme Court treated the legal question as similar or identical to the philosophical question, which Gardner would have thought was a philosophical mistake.
It might be thought that this case is an example of Enoch’s ‘import temptation’ in action, though Enoch has no problem with courts using moral-political philosophy provided there are sufficient auxiliary premises. The better conclusion was probably that of the Court of Appeal in the same case, which the Supreme Court overruled. The Court of Appeal stated:
I have to say that I did not find this part of the Appellants’ submissions helpful…Professor Gardner’s analysis is highly persuasive for the purposes for which he deploys it. But the question which we have to decide is what the policy of the law is, or should be, as regards the recovery of damages for the consequences of an act of that kind; and for that purpose these characterisations do not advance the argument.[19]
The Court of Appeal more lucidly recognises that courts are often engaged in a different project to philosophers. There might be a worry here that the import temptation was strong enough that it led the Supreme Court astray and ultimately prevailed despite the Court of Appeal’s better judgement. However, the digression into academic philosophy was only an aside, taking up no more than a paragraph in the Supreme Court’s judgment. The paragraph ended on a remark about criminal liability (i.e. a legal, not moral, consideration).
The Court of Appeal, for its part, explicitly said it was engaged in a different enterprise. I think this is right. Generalising hugely, the project of courts is to decide which of two parties should win in the context of a specific dispute, whereas philosophers more often aim to establish something true all things considered. Rarely will it be a success for a philosophical theory to apply in a single case only, whereas that will suffice perfectly well in a court case. Strictly, it is for the next court to follow/apply, distinguish or overrule the precedent. All the instant court has to do is give a judgment in the case before it. As it is for later courts to apply, distinguish or overrule a precedent, the rule that the court ends up establishing may not be the one intended. Courts need not worry about the intellectual underpinnings of their judgments, nor do they always. The UK’s highest court has said about the doctrine of transferred malice in criminal law:
Like many of its kind this is useful enough to yield rough justice, in particular cases, and it can sensibly be retained notwithstanding its lack of any sound intellectual basis.[20]
Of course, some courts will aim to make general law beyond the case in front of them. However, they are often the senior and appellate courts. We should not forget that these types of courts are not the only courts there are – though appellate courts get the most academic attention. Courts differ in their appetite and propensity to make general law. There are also institutional competence limits on courts establishing general law, much as some may wish to do so. It may be obiter dictum or even ultra vires for a court to determine issues beyond the dispute immediately before it.[21] So it is no necessary part of a court’s project to establish a general rule. If a court tries to do so, this may have no legal consequences (because obiter) and/or be an error of law (if going too far beyond that court’s institutional competence).
To conclude, given that courts and philosophers are frequently engaged on different projects, I suggest that a very pertinent methodological constraint when using scholarly works will be to ensure there is alignment between the legal and philosophical issues under consideration. If, as David Enoch argues, lawyers should be circumspect about utilising philosophical works, then perhaps philosophers should be circumspect about making legal claims too. Speaking for myself, however, I would prefer to be less defensive about our disciplinary boundaries and instead have productive cross-fertilisation wherever respectable (even if imperfect) methodological constraints can be observed.
Thank you to Shreya Atrey, Hayley Hooper, Joshua Pike, Victor Tadros and Leah Trueblood for comments on an earlier draft.
[1] Administrative Court Guide (2025), §6.34.
[2] Subsequently published in a law journal, the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf022
[3] David Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ (2025) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 872, 875-876.
[4] [1981] 3 All ER 250, 256.
[5] Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ 873.
[6] Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ 885.
[7] Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ 881-882.
[8] See footnote 30 in Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ 881.
[9] Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ 882.
[10] Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ 881-882.
[11] Enoch, ‘Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings’ 882-883.
[12] At 884, Enoch discusses what he calls a ‘political’ version of the natural language argument.
[13] Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 193-194.
[14] Rabinder Singh, The Unity of Law (Bloomsbury 2022) 26.
[15] [2026] UKSC 2.
[16] Lewis-Ranwell [2026] UKSC 2, paragraph 130.
[17] John Gardner, ‘Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility’ in Matthew Kramer, The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (OUP 2008).
[18] Gardner, ‘Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility’, 127-129.
[19] Lewis-Ranwell v G4S [2024] EWCA Civ 138, [20].
[20] AG’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245, 261 per Lord Mustill.
[21] See e.g. R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [21].
