I've recently been mulling over what seems to be a disagreement between desire-satisfaction view theorists about the proper way to formulate a desire-satisfaction view about well-being. (This thought has been inspired by discussions I've had on this blog with Chris Heathwood and Doug Portmore, and my recent unhealthy obsession with Ben Bradley's book "Well-Being and Death" which I recommend to any and all.) Briefly, I thought I'd lay out the two proposed options and the plusses and minuses of both and ask everybody for some input: which one do you prefer? Are there other arguments in favor of either side that I'm missing?
The first view, call it the "Hobbesian" approach, holds that that which benefits a given individual is the object of desire, and the explanation for this benefit is, in part, that it is desired. I call this the Hobbesian approach, because this view is introduced by Hobbes at Leviathan I 6: "Whatsoever is the object of any mans appetite or desire; that is it which he for his part calleth `good'". The official statements of Sidgwick's (at Methods 111-112), Railton's (in "Facts and Values"), and Lewis's (in "Dispositional Theories of Value") all have this feature (which is mirrored by others, Perry for instance). (Incidentally, some of these are not theories of well-being per se, but of the good on the whole, but if it's good for the good on the whole, it seems to me, it's good for the good for a person.) Very roughly, one might say that the Hobbesian approach holds that x is good for A if and only if A desires x. (I say "roughly" because there are a number of issues that are left open by this formulation that I don't <em>think</em> make any difference to the discussion here.)
The second view, call it the "Moorean" approach, holds that that which benefits a given individual is not the object of desire, but rather a conjunctive state of affairs: the state of affairs in which S desires x and x. Call this a D-state. Chris Heathwood (in "The Problem of Defective Desires"), Ben Bradley (in Well-Being and Death), and a bunch of others characterize the desire-satisfaction view in this way. To put this more technically, the Moorean approach holds that x is good for A if and only if x is an instance of a D-state of A's.
As I see it, there is one important argument in favor of the Hobbesian approach, which I'll summarize very briefly. The Hobbesian approach seems to be able to capture the "resonance" or "non-alienation" constraint on which many desire-satisfaction views rely for their motivation. As Railton notes, we should reject theories of well-being which imply that a given individual's good might fail to gain an "internal resonance"—such views would be "intolerably alienating". Without this motivation, it would seem hard to offer reasons to accept a desire-satisfaction view against more objective competitors. But the Moorean approach seems not to capture this constraint. To see why, imagine that I don't desire to vote for Sam Brownback in the upcoming Kansas governor's race. In fact, I desire never to have such a desire: I would regard my wanting to vote for Sam Brownback as a severe corruption of my moral sensibilities. But the Moorean approach would appear to say that, despite my complete aversion to wanting to vote for Sam Brownback, despite my complete aversion to the D-state in which I so desire and so vote, such a D-state is a benefit to me. But this, to me, sounds just as alienating as telling me that knowledge, great achievement, or pleasure is good for me in a way that I don't desire or value. So, anyway, that appears to me to be at least one motivation for accepting the Hobbesian approach.
The motivation for the Moorean approach seems to me to rely on a general principle of the nature of intrinsic value inspired by Moore. Ben very helpfully outlines this principle in his book, which he calls "SUP": "The intrinsic value of something depends solely on its intrinsic properties." The Hobbesian approach obviously cannot accommodate SUP: the intrinsic value of any x for A depends on some extrinsic fact about x, viz., A's desire of x. So if SUP is a plausible constraint on theories of well-being, the only desire-satisfaction view that could pass muster is the Moorean approach: the intrinsic properties of the D-state are all that appear required to explain the intrinsic value of the D-state. Anyway, that's one motivation for the Moorean approach.
Part of the reason for my post here is to see if there are other arguments in favor of either approach. But as a very limited comment on the arguments presented here, my own view is that the desire-satisfaction view is much better served by the Hobbesian approach rather than the Moorean approach (whether or not the DS view could ultimately be defended). Of course, this leaves the desire-satisfaction view with the burden of rejecting SUP. But I wonder if the motivation for the Hobbesian view couldn't also be a motivation to reject SUP itself: if one important constraint on any welfare good x is that x "resonate" or "fail to alienate", it would appear that an extrinsic fact is at least partially required to explain x's intrinsic value. But this might just come down to a disagreement about whether the non-alienation constraint or SUP is more plausible as a general thesis about well-being.
Jeez. Sorry for all the parentheticals!
Hi Dale,
Very interesting! As someone who has in the past taken the Moorean approach to formulating the DS view, I think that I’m persuaded that the DS view is better off taking the Hobbesian approach for the reasons that you cite. Of course, I never found SUP a plausible constraint on theories of well-being. And I have yet to read Ben’s book.
Hi Dale,
I wonder if your objection to the Moorean view can be avoided by relying on the structure of desires, in the way that Griffin does in *Well-Being*. It would seem that the problem the Moorean has is that some lower level desire of mine (I desire to vote for Brownback) might conflict with one of my higher level desires (I desire to be the kind of person who never wants to vote for someone like Brownback). But if we consider the strength of a desire to be something that varies according to the level of the desire, or its structural features, as Griffin suggests, then perhaps this lower level desire need not be given so much weight in terms of your welfare. Of course, this move will not allow the Moorean to say that voting for Brownback in the case where to desire to do so will have no positive impact on your welfare, and perhaps that is your objection–that it should not be counted for anything. But if that is your objection, then I think I’m not sure I share your intuition.
On second thought…Here’s a worry about the Hobbesian DS view. It implies that a posthumous state of affairs could be good for someone. Suppose that I desire that my book be widely read one hundred years after my death. On the Hobbesian DS view, this state of affairs is good for me. It might be more plausible, though, to think that it is not this state of affairs but the condition of my being in a D-state in virtue of the fact that this state of affairs will obtain that’s good for me. We might think that what’s good for a person and that person must be contemporaneous. The Hobbesian DS view denies this. So this might be another constraint that one might appeal to in defending the Moorean View: X’s obtaining at t is good for an agent A if and only if A exists at t.
@Scott: I wasn’t quite thinking of the problem in that way. The problem I was noting was that I might be alienated from certain D-states, which the Moorean view declares are good for me. I’m not sure I see how your suggestion solves this worry, although perhaps I’m missing something. Could you say a bit more, perhaps?
@Doug: I agree that there are problems with the Hobbesian view when it comes to posthumous harm, but I’m not sure I agree that the Moorean view can avoid them. (Here I’m just aping what Ben has to say about this in his book.) If we accept that “X’s obtaining at t is good for an agent A if and only if A exists at t”, this helps the Moorean view only if X, i.e., the D-state, obtains when, and only when, A exists. But take your case. When does the state of *your desiring that your book is read 100 years after your death and your book being read 100 years after your death* obtain? I’m not sure there’s any principled reason to believe that this conjunctive state of affairs, if it obtains at a particular time at all, obtains *only* when you’re alive, given that a substantial part of it obtains after you’re dead. Of course, this is a thorny ontological issue about time-incongruous states of affairs, and I’m not sure I’ve got these issues fully sorted out in my head.
Although I do have a sinking feeling that I’ve missed something important in your comment.
Scott – so long as the kind of ‘structure’ you’re appealing to is merely synchronic, we’re still going to be able to raise diachronic objections against the Moorean. For example, suppose that in future you will acquire a whole-hearted desire to vote for Brownback (i.e., and lose your current higher-order desire to not be that kind of person). So long as you currently find this prospect abhorrent, it seems odd to say that this outcome would be good for you, or worth pursuing for your sake.
Dale – my main worry for the Moorean view is that it seems to license Inducing Desire Satisfactions. (I’m not sure whether this is exactly the same objection as your ‘alienation’ one, just worded differently, or if it is a slightly broader objection.)
I think that time-inconsistent agents also pose problems for simple Hobbesian views. First suppose you never actually desire to vote for Brownback. So the counterfactual state of affairs wherein such a desire is induced and satisfied, is not a state of affairs containing the objects of your actual desires. It is thus a low-value state of affairs for you. So far so good. But now suppose instead that this low-value possibility were actualized, so that in future you will actually desire to vote for Brownback (and do so). Then your so voting is an object of your (future) desire, and its realization is thus good for you (on a simple Hobbesian account). So there is high value in this state of affairs after all.
The upshot, if I’ve interpreted the Hobbesian view correctly, is that the welfare value of a possibility is radically relative to its modal status: it might be a low-value possibility if considered counterfactually, and yet a high-value possibility if actualized. This is very odd. (It violates the intuitive principle that Moral Status is Modally Robust.)
One response for the Hobbesian is to idealize, i.e. say that what’s good for you is to achieve the objects of your ideal desires, not just your actual desires. Combine this with a view of personal identity such that two person-stages with different ideal global preferences are thereby different people, and we have ensured stability and non-alienation. (Induce new desires in me all you like, it won’t change my idealized desires. Unless you change me so much that I’m effectively replaced by a different person. But that result won’t be any good for me, at least.)
The Moorean DS View could go like this: x is good for A if and only if x is an instance of A’s being in a D-state. A is in a D-state if and only if A desires that P and P is true.
A will be in a D-state only when A exists, for A desires that P only when A exists. Thus, the Moorean DS View will abide by the following constraint: X’s obtaining at t is good for an agent A only if A exists at t. (Originally, I had wrote “if and only if” in my statement of the constraint. That’s obviously problematic. In any case, the Hobbesian DS View violates this constraint in that it allows that X’s obtaining at t can be good for A even if A does not exist at t.)
Dale,
I think I did misunderstand your example, and thought, as Richard suggests, that there was an actual conflict of desires in it.
Now, perhaps I am just a bit dense here, but when you put the problem the way you did in your reply, I fail to see how the Hobbesian approach has advantages over the Moorean with regard to resonance.
As I understand the example, you do not now have any desire at all to vote for Brownback. The supposed problem for the Moorean view is that this view commits you to saying (1) that the D state that consists of the conjunction of (you desiring to vote for Brownback and you actually voting for Brownback) is good for you. But how is that any different from saying to you, more simply, that (2) if you wanted to vote for Brownback then it would be good for you if you were to vote for Brownback? And won’t we say the same thing on the Hobbesian view as well? Or is there some important difference between (1) and (2)?
@Richard: Thanks for the comment. I haven’t looked at your posts in detail, but I think, based on a quick scan, that we might have some of the same ideas in mind. WRT the problem for the Hobbesian approach: that’s a very interesting problem, but I wonder if the Hobbesian might avoid it by making a move with regard to time (a move that they probably need to make anyhow). In other words, a Hobbesian might say that x is good for A at t if and only if A desires x at t. Something like that. In that way, some particular x would be both low value possibilia for A *at t* and a low value actual state of affairs for A *at t*, given the structure of A’s desires at t. This would keep the modal evaluative status of those states of affairs identical. Does that address your worry? (I realize that this view about time implies some results that some find intuitive, like, for instance, posthumous harms are possible, etc.; I don’t find these all that problematic, but, as Doug notes, this is a worry some have.)
@Doug: Ah! I see. Your Moorean view is different than the one I offered. You’re right—that does, I think, avoid the problem about posthumous harm. I’ll have to think more about that way of phrasing the view, and I continue to think that the non-alienation constraint is overriding, but that’s a further consideration that’s work attention. Thanks!
@Scott: But I think there is an important difference between (1) and (2). In (1), that which is good for you is understood in a way that need make no reference at all to your actual attitudes, values, or what you find compelling or attractive. Everyone’s good is the same: all instances of D-states starring me are good me (just as all instances of D-states staring you are good for you). But I might find some D-states starring me abhorrent (such as the Brownback one), and would reject the claim that such D-states are good for me. (2) is different: it’s making a counterfactual claim about what my good would be under different desiderative conditions. (Or what my good might come to be under different desiderative conditions.) I might admit that were my values to change, I might be made better off by a particular D-state (which is allowed by the Hobbesian view) but reject the claim that, given my values as they are, that particular D-state is good for me. I think that’s an important difference, and one that tells in favor of the Hobbesian view.
Hi Dale, if we restrict ourselves to time-relative welfare judgments, the Moorean can avoid (synchronous) alienation in just the same way. That is, the abhorrent D-state is not good for me now; it’s merely good for me at t (the time when I’m actually in the D-state). But this seems bad enough. We’re still left with diachronic alienation, or the claim that abhorrent future D-states will be good for me. (Which might imply that there are reasons of beneficence to bring about this future state of affairs.) And the Hobbesian view has the same conditional verdict as before: (i) If I actually am in the D-state at t, then this [realized] prospect is good for me at t. (ii) If I am not in the D-state at t, and instead still abhor the idea, then this [counterfactual] prospect is bad for me at t.
A student told me someone on the internet was obsessed with me. Imagine my disappointment to find out it was Dale. Well, I’ll take what I can get.
Anyway, I think this is interesting. I am inclined to think that not much should hang on the distinction between Hobbesian and Moorean versions of the view. After all, on both views, the same facts about the world determine how well things go for you: facts about your desires and facts about whether they are satisfied. The only difference is which things get to be the value bearers. I am partial to the Moorean view because I think that the best accounting principles require us to include, in the basic value bearers, instantiations of *all* the properties that determine how well things go for you.
I think there is another distinction that we need to keep separate from the Hobbesian/Moorean one. When evaluating how well things go at some other possible world W1, we can look at the person’s desires at W1 or at the actual world @. Call the first view possibilism and the second actualism. Dale, correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you think the Hobbesian view is better because it is compatible with actualism and Mooreanism isn’t. Is that right?
But I think the Moorean view is compatible with actualism too. The Moorean actualist could say this: the basic intrinsic value states are of the following form: (i) S desires that P at @ and (ii) P at w. Those states contribute their value to S’s welfare level at w. S’s counterfactual desires are not part of any basic intrinsic value state. So you can get the results you want in the Brownback case. Or, the Moorean could say (along the lines of Richard’s last comment) that well-being is relative to a world; if S desires at w1 that P, and P obtains at w2, then S’s life in w2 has greater w1-relative-value. What do you think of that?
@Richard: Right. You’ve convinced me that re: Hobbesian approach, time-relativity is beside the point. But I’m still not convinced that a relativized Moorean approach could avoid alienation, nor am I convinced that there’s a problem here for the Hobbesian view.
First, you say that, on the Moorean approach, “[T]he abhorrent D-state is not good for me now; it’s merely good for me at t (the time when I’m actually in the D-state).” But that’s not the way I’ve understood the Moorean view. (Perhaps you have a different understanding?) For the Moorean view, at any time t, that which is intrinsically valuable for me is every D-state starring me. But this view has alienation problems: some of these D-states I will find abhorrent, despite their being highly ranked in my utility function as understood by the Moorean view.
You might do one of two things. You might (a) take Doug’s approach, which I think is interesting. But this is a different view. My good is not composed of D-states, but rather of all states of affairs in which I am in a D-state. Call these “E-states”. Furthermore, I don’t see this as much of a solution to the alienation problems given that I may find some of these E-states as abhorrent as any D-state. You might also (b) limit the D-states that compose my good at any given point. But you can’t limit the intrinsically good D-states to those that resonate with me; this would violate SUP, and hence a primary motivation for the Moorean view. Alternatively, you might limit it simply to those D-states in which I desire the relevant x, which makes up the lefthand side of the D-state. But this only guarantees that the relevant x resonates, not the D-state, which is a conjunction of my desire of x with the relevant x. Furthermore, this suggestion would also violate SUP. Imagine the Brownback D-state. On this view, the Brownback D-state is not good for me because I don’t desire to vote for Brownback. But here facts about the intrinsic value of the Brownback D-state are determined by facts extrinsic to the D-state, i.e., my lack of a desire to vote for Brownback.
Second, you say that “the Hobbesian view has the same conditional verdict as before: (i) If I actually am in the D-state at t, then this [realized] prospect is good for me at t. (ii) If I am not in the D-state at t, and instead still abhor the idea, then this [counterfactual] prospect is bad for me at t.” I’m having trouble parsing this idea, but let me put it in terms that I’m comfortable with (I hope this roughly captures your concern). In particular, we have to keep in mind that the value bearer, for the Hobbesian view, is the object of desire, not the D-state. On this assumption, take the Brownback D-state. (i) If I am actually in the D-state at t, then voting for Brownback is good for me. OK. I agree that the Hobbesian view says this. Why? Because if I am in the D-state, this implies that I desire to vote for Brownback, hence voting for Brownback is intrinsically good for me. (ii) If I am not in the D-state at t, and instead still abhor the idea, then voting for Brownback is not intrinsically good for me. OK. I also agree that the Hobbesian view says this. Because I abhor the idea, voting for Brownback is not intrinsically good for me.
But put this way, I’m not seeing the problem. (I’m unsure of this, partly because I’m unsure that I’ve interpreted your worry correctly.) Isn’t this just a different way of saying: “were I to desire different things, different things would be good for me”? Anyway, maybe there’s a problem here but it would be surprising to me to discover that there were. I think the key for the Hobbesian view is that the D-states are not themselves the intrinsic value bearers. Rather, it is the object of a desire: if I desire x at t, x is intrinsically valuable for me at t, no matter x’s modal status, and vice versa.
@Ben: Hey, I never said I was obsessed with YOU. Only your BOOK.
I do think there is something really important in the difference between the Hobbesian view and the Moorean view. Part of this I’ve already mentioned in a response to Scott above: the Moorean view, by virtue of claiming that D-states, rather than the objects of desire, are valuable, need make no reference to my actual desires, pro-attitudes, values, or whatever, in giving a full account of that which is intrinsically valuable for me. And this is a direct result of its choice of value bearers. It is true that the same facts about the world determine how well things go for you, but “how well things go for you” is very different than “what is intrinsically good for you”. It seems plausible to me that the resonance constraint should hold of the latter, but obviously this is only one consideration among many.
But I hope I’m not just playing Richard Dreyfuss to your Teri Garr.
So I don’t think my concern is actualism versus possibilism; I agree that the Moorean view can do either. Rather, the concern is that, in the actual world, the Moorean view appears to imply that certain alienation-causing value bearers are good for me.
(Hey, off-topic: what do you make of Doug’s version of the Moorean view? Might that view avoid some of your time-based worries in WB&D, 18-30?)
‘Isn’t this just a different way of saying: “were I to desire different things, different things would be good for me”?‘
Not exactly. There’s an innocuous reading of this phrase on which it merely says that your welfare in a possible world depends on what you desire in that world. But what we have here is the stranger claim that the welfare value of a possible world depends on what you desire in the actual world (so the value of a world w is not intrinsically fixed, even by internal desire facts, but varies depending on which world is actual). Maybe that’s not a huge problem, but it’s definitely a bit odd.
A more pressing worry is that the Hobbesian seems susceptible to alienation objections just like the Moorean. This is because a simple (non-idealized) Hobbesian view implies that I will be benefited if you induce in me some abhorrent D-states. And how is that any better than the objectionable Moorean claim that “certain alienation-causing value bearers are good for me”? Merely making the alienating alleged ‘benefit’ future-tensed doesn’t make it any less alienating from my current perspective. Inducing abhorrent D-states in my future self just isn’t good at all.
While welfare-value is a species of direct or final value (as opposed to instrumental value), I do not see why it needs to be a species of intrinsic value in the sense that it must depend on the valuable item’s intrinsic properties. If someone believes that non-instrumental value must be determined by intrinsic properties, I would like to see the argument for that claim. (I sort of hoped that welfare would be possible and actual even if there were no intrinsic properties!)
I think that Doug is exactly correct about the main reason to avoid the Hobbesian view as it is stated by Hobbes. If we merely say that if S desires x at any time (we could even add that S cannot later desire ~x), then x itself is good for S should it ever transpire, then we are open to the possibility of posthumous benefit and harm, which does not seem to me to be in the spirit of desire-satisfactionism.
Whether we follow the Hobbesian or the Moorean approach, it follows that we can greatly benefit a person by inducing desires in them for actual states of affairs. I agree with Richard that this is problematic.
In my own view, the best that can be done to avoid this is to say something like this: the object of a person’s desire is beneficial to the person at the time it occurs or obtains, provided that (a) the person still has the desire at that time, and (b) the desire is one of their genuine values (I am imagining that we can cash out “valuing” in a Frankfurtian sort of way.) This resembles one of Dale’s proposals, except I have added some extra machinery to deal with alienation.
Dale,
I think I am merely echoing sentiments expressed by Richard here, but let me see if this makes sense to you. You claim that the Moorean faces the problem of resonance because the D state that is abhorrent is, in fact, good for you now, as you actually are, whereas for the Hobbesian your voting for Brownback would be good for you only if your desires were different than they in fact are. But this obscures the fact that the abhorrent D state has a counter-factual element to it as a constitutive part. In other words, the D state consists of you, contrary to actual fact, desiring to vote for Brownback.
Or maybe I can put it this way: Suppose someone were to say to you: “You know, if your desires were different than they are, and you wanted to vote for Brownback, then voting for Brownback would be good for you.” I think that, regardless of what version of the theory you think is right, you will find the suggestion problematic, given your current desires. You will think that if you were such a person with such desires, then your life would be pretty bad for you. The Moorean seems committed to this implication because it consists of a D-state in whcih you figure; the Hobbesian is committed to it because your voting for Brownback is the object of your desire. The problem arises because, on either view, counter-factual desire are in conflict with your actual desires.
@Richard: Ah! I see better your first worry. Offhand, I don’t find it that odd, but perhaps there’s something there to mull over.
Unless I’ve gotten you really really wrong, your second worry seems to be just a general worry about desire or preference change. In other words, I might despise the possibility of becoming a country music lover. But were I, as a result of mistakenly attending some Garth Brooks concert or something, to become a country music lover, listening to country music would be good for me at the time at which I loved country music. But, right now, I find that D-state totally abhorrent. The problem seems the same whether the new values are induced or not.
But if this is a problem, this is a problem shared by the Moorean and the Hobbesian. However, if we are interested in the comparative plausibility of each view, the Hobbesian view can, at least, grant me sovereignty over that which is intrinsically good for me now, which is barred by the Moorean view. I might, on the Hobbesian view or any other view, be averse to that which I go on to desire later, alienating me from my future benefits (whether as a result of inducement or whatever preference-change mechanism). But the sense in which a Hobbesian view cannot avoid alienation seems to me the sense in which no view can avoid alienation: over the course of time, some of our values may very well change in ways we previously thought abhorrent. That which resonates with me in the future I might find abhorrent now. But I’m doubtful that any theory of well-being can avoid that form of alienation. But there is an important form of alienation that we can avoid, and which the Hobbesian avoids.
@Jason: Right; I was assuming (perhaps tacitly) that desiring is sufficient for “genuinely valuing” (which I actually don’t believe, but I thought I’d assume it for the sake of argument). (I discuss this problem in a paper of mine: Preferences, Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias.
We should distinguish two forms of posthumous harm. Roughly, one might be: (a) things that happen after I die can affect my well-being. The other, which is not implied by the former is: (b) things that happen after I die can benefit or burden me while I’m dead. I’m not sure the former is incongruous with a DS view: if I desire to become recognized as a great guitar player only after my death, the fact that becoming so recognized benefits me is surely within the spirit of a DS view, given that it satisfies an important desire of mine. Even Doug’s replacement view implies (a).
Now, you might think (b) is incongruous with a DS view. You might object on the grounds that this event benefits me after I die. But that could be handled by the sort of time-relativization I’m imagining above: x is good for A at t if and only if A desires x at t. If so, my being recognized as a super-sweet guitar player after my death doesn’t benefit me THEN, but rather benefits me NOW: while I desire it. (Indeed, taking seriously the resonance constraint, this seems to be the only serious option: after death, nothin’ resonates with nobody.) There are some good objections to this sort of a view, but that might be one way for the Hobbesian to handle worries about posthumous harm.
@Scott: Much of my reply to Richard applies here. I’ll try to put it slightly differently. There is, as I understand it, a philosophically interesting and significant difference between the following two claims. (Assume A abhors x, and abhors the state of affairs in which A desires x and x.)
(1) If A’s desires were different, x would be intrinsically valuable for A.
and
(2) The state of affairs in which A desires x and x is intrinsically valuable for A.
The difference is that (1) doesn’t say anything about that which is good for me. It only says something about that which would be good for me under other conditions. (2) says something about what is good for me. But if we believe that a resonance condition holds of that which is good for me, (1) satisfies it, (2) violates it.
Now, it might be that any old agent might reject (1). But this would not violate the previous resonance constraint, it would violate a different resonance constraint. Consider two statements of a resonance or non-alienation constraint (these are really rough, sorry):
(3): any sentence of the form “x is good for A” must resonate with A.
(4): any sentence of the form “x is good for A” or “x would be good for A” must resonate with A.
The Hobbesian violates (4), as you note. For the Hobbesian, were it the case that I desired to vote for Brownback, voting for him would be good for me, despite the fact that I might object to the claim that voting for Brownback would, under any conditions, be good for me. But this seems to be a wildly high standard to set for resonance that no view could accommodate. But as I noted in the previous response to Richard, if we are deciding between the Moorean and Hobbesian views, there is an interesting and important form of resonance that is worth accommodating: (3), which the Hobbesian view, and not the Moorean view, can accommodate.
I should say that this discussion is really sharpening my understanding of this particular dispute, so I’m really appreciative!
Dale,
This is all extremely interesting. I just have a small comment on posthumous harms and benefits on the Hobbesian view. I think the way you’ve sorted out the time of the event or state of affairs that does the benefiting and the time at which you are benefited is exactly what the Hobbesian should say: You are benefited NOW (while alive) in light of the satisfaction LATER (while dead) of your desire to be recognized as a great guitar player.
I agree that this is not incongruous with a DS view, and would be a plausible thing for the Hobbesian to say about posthumous harms and benefits. There are, however, further implications from this line of thought. I think some may see these implications as a reductio of the Hobbesian view on posthumous harms and benefits that you stated, but I actually think that the Hobbesian desire theorist should just bite the bullet on all of this.
First, I think it follows that one can be benefited NOW in light of what happens LATER, when one is alive both NOW and LATER. This isn’t so strange. I desire to run on the treadmill from 5:00 until 5:30. It comes to pass that that’s exactly what I do. So I have benefited at all of the times I held that desire, say between 4:45 and 5:30.
Now, what many will find a far stranger implication is that I can be benefited NOW from what happens LATER, even if LATER I don’t want then what I want NOW. So, today I desire fame for myself tomorrow. Tomorrow I’m famous, but I no longer desire it. I can’t be better off tomorrow in light of the satisfaction of today’s desire, for I do not hold that desire tomorrow. So I’m better off today in light of what happens tomorrow. (I think this is Heathwood’s example, though not his take on it.) I suppose one could say there’s a relevant difference between a desire going away due to death and losing a desire by changing one’s mind, and try to block this implication with that distinction, but I don’t see a lot of promise in that approach.
These implications might be just what you have in mind when you say that there “are some good objections to this sort of view,” in which case, sorry to state the obvious.
@Donald: Totally!! I think those are worries, but you’re right, I think the best thing to do here is to bite those bullets. In fact, I don’t find them all that strange. If I desire fame at t, get it at t1, but don’t desire it at t1, my t1-fame doesn’t benefit me at t1, but it does benefit me when I desired it: t. I dig this view. (Actually, I’m in the very very early stages of trying to work a defense of this view up into a paper, but there’s a long way to go.) Imagine a more vivid example. Let’s say that, at age 19, I was a hard-core punk rocker, and I desire that all Kenny-G-loving-squares suffer, no matter who they are. At age 50, I’ve become a Kenny-G-loving-square. Imagine that at age 50, I suffer. At age 50, I don’t desire the suffering, so my suffering is not good for me at age 50. But I think it’s plausible to say that my age-50-suffering is good for me at age 19. It satisfies a desire I had at 19.
Ben has some cool objections to this view in his book that I’m sorting through, but I’m inclined to bite these bullets, as you say.
Dale: my understanding of the “desire-satisfactionist intuition” is not compatible with either form of posthumous benefit or harm.
In response to (a): I do not think desire-satisfactionists should allow that something that has not yet happened could benefit or harm me now — or in any way have a bearing on the welfare-value of an earlier life segment. I understand that there are theoretical reasons to understand satisfaction as fulfillment (as Griffin does). But surely part of the intuitive case for desire-satisfactionism is that unfulfilled longing, hankering, or yearning is bad for one, while a sense of satisfaction — “thirst quenched,” metaphorically speaking — is good. (These thoughts may be incompatible with a deprivation account of the evil of death, but perhaps desire-satisfactionists should not favor such an account.)
In response to (b): as we seem to have agreed, the best form of desire-satisfactionism requires that one still have the desires (whose objects are beneficial) at the time they are satisfied. Dead people cannot have desires, so synchronic desire-satisfaction or frustration is impossible for them.
But perhaps there is not really a shared “desire-satisfactionist intuition,” only my private sense of which versions of the theory are plausible.
Dale,
x is good for A at t if and only if A desires x at t.
Suppose I desire world peace at the present. Does it follow, on this view, that world peace is good for me at present? It would be strange to think that world peace is good for me at present when there is at present no such peace.
Doug,
My wife told me I should buy some cruciferous vegetables at the market today, and when I asked why, she said that cruciferous vegetables are good for us. If I had objected that they couldn’t be good for us, on the grounds that we didn’t have any, that would not have been good for me.
@Jason: I think you’re right that your version of the DS rationale is incompatible with posthumous harms or benefits, but offhand that does seem to be a different rationale. It seems to me that on your view, a D-state (to take the Moorean version) would have to include the state of you *knowing* or *feeling* that your desire is satisfied, and perhaps even feeling good about this, or something like that. Chris Heathwood’s got a view like this, though I couldn’t find the paper on his website. The rationale for the views I’ve stated, or at least one of them, is that what is good for you is the “coming about” of that which you value, or that which matters to you. And I don’t think this would require any sense “thirst quenched”, for instance.
@Doug: I think I want to second what Jamie says. I might be a total grouch, I take no pleasure in life, nor will I ever. But surely it isn’t strange to say that pleasure is intrinsically valuable for me, even under these conditions.
Dale – on my first worry, consider Dancy’s objection to modally unstable value (Ethics Without Principles, p.206):
“Could there be any difference between the values of merely possible objection and the values of those objects should they become real? No; for otherwise the activity of establishing the relative values of different possibilities would be incoherent. And this would make deliberation before action incoherent, if deliberation is the establishing of relative values of possibilities so as to decide which to make actual.”
Or, as my earlier linked post put it, we seem to end up saying that whether it’s right or wrong for me to perform the act in question depends on whether I actually do it. It would be wrong (bad) for me to induce in you an abhorrent D-state, unless I actually do it, in which case it would be good. You’ve gotta admit that’s odd.
“I’m doubtful that any theory of well-being can avoid that [diachronic] form of alienation.”
What’s wrong with the proposal in my first comment upthread? (I take it that seemingly abhorrent values are only really alienating if you would find them abhorrent on ideal reflection; mere prima facie abhorrence is nothing to worry about.)
Jamie (and Dale),
I’m sorry. Obviously, what I said was way too brief to adequately convey my worries.
First, a small point: I thought that Dale was giving an account of what’s non-instrumentally good for A. Cruciferous vegetables are not non-instrumentally good for you. If you buy them and don’t eat them, they’ll do you no good (unless, of course, you desire simply that it be the case that you buy them — assuming the DS View, that is).
In any case, my question stems from certain remarks that Dale makes above. First, he gives the time-relative account of good-for that I quote above and then he seems to infer claims such as the following: “If I desire fame at t, get it at t1, but don’t desire it at t1, my t1-fame doesn’t benefit me at t1, but it does benefit me when I desired it [emphasis added].”
So, Dale, what’s your account of benefit? Surely, it isn’t the following: “x is a benefit to A at t if and only if A desires x at t.” And if it’s not this, then how am I supposed to move from the Hobbesian view — i.e., the view that x is good for A at t if and only if A desires x at t — to the claim that “If I desire fame at t, get it at t1, but don’t desire it at t1, my t1-fame doesn’t benefit me at t1, but it does benefit me when I desired it”?
Suppose I desire at t to be famous at t but do not desire at t to be famous at t1. Does my t1-fame benefit me at t even though I didn’t desire at t t1-fame?
So I see how the Moorean View — the view that x is a benefit to A at t if and only if x is an instance of A’s being in a D-state at t, where A is in a D-state at t if and only if A desires at t that P and it is, at t, true that P — gets the sort of intuitive verdicts that we want in these sorts of cases, but I’m not seeing what the version of the Hobbesian View is that gets these intuitive verdicts. So what is the Hobbesian View of benefits that is supposed to get the intuitive verdicts that you want in these types of cases?
Apologies for the typo, I meant to write: “the values of merely possible objects…”
@Richard: As you may be beginning to realize, it often takes three or four whacks over the head for me to get the gist. I thank you for being patient!
What you say is definitely odd. (The Hobbesian view doesn’t violate the Dancy quote, I don’t think, because D-states are not intrinsically valuable for the Hobbesian; the objects of desire are equally valuable whether they are merely possible or actual; there’s no modal variation.) But I don’t think the Hobbesian (or the Moorean) has to say that. Part of the problem has to do with the relationship between “bad for me” and “wrong for you to do to me”. There are a number of interesting issues here: if a particular thing harms me at a particular time, but benefits me overall (i.e., in terms of my lifetime welfare), I doubt that it’s plausible to say that you’ve done something wrong to me. (Indeed, I think time-inconsistent agents, as you call them, present a problem not so much for DS views, but for normative theories, for precisely the reasons you note.) If so, though your inducing of a D-state in me would be bad for me at a particular time, i.e., those times at which I found it abhorrent, doing so is not wrong because it would be a benefit to me overall; it would make my whole life go better than it otherwise would have. So in that case, it is not wrong whether you do it or not. (Again, I discuss some of these issues in a paper called “Preferences, Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias”.)
This response is not very well worked-out, but my general conviction when it comes to these sorts of issues is that when there’s an unintuitive verdict coming from the conjunction of claims about goodness and about moral obligation, is the moral claims, not the evaluative claims, that need to be revised. In other words, to revise an otherwise plausible verdict about what is good for me and why on the basis that this would deliver an unintuitive verdict about moral theory seems unmotivated. But this is just a general conviction on the basis that such a methodological procedure “seems right to me”.
Re: your proposal. Right! I gave that short shrift. Offhand, I don’t see that the “idealized” move itself would eliminate alienation worries (because the induced D-states could be induced “idealized” D-states, couldn’t they?), but your proposal that “two person-stages with different ideal global preferences are thereby different people” might do the trick. As a first reaction, I’m not sure I’m comfortable with that theory of personal identity (couldn’t a person at t have ideal preferences x, but over the course of a long time (t100) come to prefer different things?). But—I’m musing here—you might say that such a *radical* shift, i.e., t: global preferences x, t1: global preferences z, might interrupt the personal identity relation. Yeah. I can dig that.
@Doug: I see the problem better now. I’ll say what I was thinking, and you can tell me whether I’ve jumped off a cliff. Off the top of my head, I always thought that the “benefit” idea runs this way: x benefits A at t if and only if x is intrinsically good for A at t AND x occurs. This view is good for the Hobbesian and Moorean approaches. For your version of the Moorean view, an E-state (i.e., a state of affairs in which I am in a D-state) is a benefit to me at t if and only if that E-state is intrinsically good for me at t and that E-state occurs. For the Hobbesian, x is a benefit to me at t if and only if I desire x at t, and x occurs.
But your question will be: but at what time must x occur? But this is irrelevant from the standpoint of theory. Fully spelled out, the desire itself will contain the appropriate time of occurrence (or one could insist that it does via a method of idealization). I take it that the desire to be famous is tantamount to saying that: “I want it to be such that there is a time in my life at which I am famous”. In this case, what is intrinsically good for me is for there to be a time in my life at which I am famous. If I am famous at t1, x occurs: there is a time in my life at which I am famous. Alternatively, I might desire “to be famous at t1”. If so, if x only occurs if I am famous at t1. (How much of a benefit it is depends on, e.g., strength of desire, preference-ranking, etc., etc., just as it would for the Moorean.)
So the fame case is answered in this way: I desire fame at t, in a way that is not time-indexed: I just want it to be the case that I am famous at some time or other. Fame is intrinsically good for me at t. I lose that desire at t1. Fame is not intrinsically good for me at t1. I get fame at t1. That fame, because it is an instance of the occurrence of the relevant x, which I desire at t, benefits me at t. It does not benefit me at t1, because it is not intrinsically good for me at t1.
You ask “Suppose I desire at t to be famous at t but do not desire at t to be famous at t1. Does my t1-fame benefit me at t even though I didn’t desire at t t1-fame?” So I’m supposed to imagine here that I have a non-time-indexed desire to be famous, and also a time-indexed desire not to be famous. But these are just two conflicting desires, no? Let’s say I get fame at t1. It benefits me to the extent that it satisfies my desire at t to be famous at some time or other. But it harms me to the extent that I desire, at t, not to be famous (time-indexed) at t1. You may or may not think these conflicting desires present a problem (I do) but I think that’s the right way to handle them for the Hobbesian.
But now I’m having second thoughts about whether your version of a Moorean view presents advantages over the Hobbesian view. After all, your Moorean view is only one version. The Moorean view could approach time in the following way: what is good for me is the state of “desiring, at t, x and x” (or the state of “being in a state of ‘desiring, at t, x and x'”) x here needn’t occur at the time of desire. Your view seems to insist that what is good for you is the state of “desiring, at t, x and x at t” (or rather the state of “being in a state of ‘desiring, at t, x and x at t'”). Maybe that’s the right move, but the Moorean needn’t adopt it. But couldn’t the Hobbesian view make the same move? Couldn’t the Hobbesian view say that x is intrinsically good for A at t if and only if x is desired by A at t and x occurs at t?
Offhand, I think both moves should be avoided. Such a move would have the result of ruling out the welfare-relevance of all future-directed desires. But that seems too radical. Imagine that for my entire life, I desire to retire in Italy, and work tirelessly to achieve this goal. Just before I’m about to retire, I lose the desire to do so; I’m strictly indifferent. But I end up in Italy anyway. I find it hard to believe that the fact that I end up in Italy makes no difference whatever to my well-being at any time. (Ben has some other points to make against this sort of a view, BTW.) But we might just be pushing intuitions back and forth.
Dang, that’s a long comment. Sorry guys!
Hi Dale,
That was long. I’ll need to digest it some. But here’s one quick question and one quick point:
x benefits A at t if and only if x is intrinsically good for A at t AND x occurs.
What does the variable ‘x’ range over? Do non-events occur? Or do you want to claim that only events can be intrinsically good for A? If you do want to allow that objects and states of affairs can be intrinsically good for A, then could you explain what it means for such objects and states to occur?
You ask “Suppose I desire at t to be famous at t but do not desire at t to be famous at t1. Does my t1-fame benefit me at t even though I didn’t desire at t t1-fame?” So I’m supposed to imagine here that I have a non-time-indexed desire to be famous, and also a time-indexed desire not to be famous.
Surely, the desire at t to be famous at t is a time-indexed desire if and only if the desire at t to be famous at t1 is a time-indexed desire. I think that you must have misunderstood the example.
@Doug: You’re right to note a mistake here. I was trying to use “occur” as sort of a catch-all term for whatever success conditions are appropriate for the sort of thing a particular Hobbesian view would prefer ‘x’ to range over (in other words, I didn’t really want to take a stand on events-objects-states). But I should have explained that. I suppose you could replace the term “occurs” with whatever is appropriate. (Perhaps “obtains” would work for states, or more generically, if you understand the objects of desires as propositions, “is true”.)
Also, I totally biffed your example, as I see now. I think the right answer to your actual case is that your t1 fame doesn’t benefit you at t if, at t, you desire to be famous at t.
@オテモヤン: Exactly!
I didn’t read all the previous comments carefully cause I just wanted to make an obvious point carelessly. It seems to me that the Mooreian view you describe could avoid the problem you mention by adding more in. Say, perhaps, that x is good for you when you intrinsically want yourself to intrinsically want x and x occurs. In fact, if what you say is a prob for the Moorian, I would think it should also be a prob for the Hobbesian since we could have unendorsed first order desires which the Hobbesian would be forced to say benefit one. The answer for both views, it seems to me, is to try (perhaps in Railton style) to try to build a kind of non-alienation from the desire into the account of the relevant kind of desires.
Off the top of my head I am tempted to guess that there need not be any extentional difference in the Moorian and Hobbesian views, depending on how we flesh them out.
@David: I’m not sure that works for the Moorean. You could specify the view you mention in one of two ways:
1. x is good for A if and only if x is a D-state, and A wants x.
This would be no good for the Moorean, though, because it violates SUP.
2. Call an R-state a conjunctive state of affairs in which A wants to want y and y. x is good for A if and only if x is an R-state.
This would, essentially, be an “idealized” Moorean view. (Ultimately, I think this is the right move for both the Moorean and the Hobbesian, for the problem you mention.) But I don’t see why, if the relevant value-fixing attitude is “wanting to want”, I’d be guaranteed to want to want particular R-states. In other words, imagine one R-state is the state of me wanting to want to vote for Brownback and voting for Brownback. But I certainly don’t want to want that state. So I don’t see how the Moorean gets out of this problem no matter how you identify the value-fixing attitude, or relevant kind of desire.
It is true that the same facts about the world determine how well things go for you, but “how well things go for you” is very different than “what is intrinsically good for you”.
Hi Dale, just a clarificatory question. Could you say more about what you take the difference to be? Is the thought just that the former pertains to one’s level of well-being while the latter pertains to things that positively impact one’s well-being level?
Dale: Call situations in which I want to want x and x is the case R situations. I take you to be saying that one need not want an R-type situation. I think that is right. But I take your point about alien desires to be that we should not think the normatively important attitude is first order desires (because one might be alienated from them). So for your point to be in good order, we need to think that first order desires do not secure the appropriate connection between a person and something that benefits her. So the fact that a person might not have a first order desire for an R situation now seems not crucial, I would have said.
I guess I am also confused about SUP; the thesis that “The intrinsic value of something depends solely on its intrinsic properties.” First, if something is good for me, does that mean it necessarily has the kind of intrinsic value SUP speaks about? Second, even if so, it would take a to my mind odd view of well-being to think that if X is good for me, that means X itself has intrinsic value independently of any attitude I might have towards X. On one seemingly sensible view at least about matters of mere taste, we should not look for the value merely in the object but rather in how the object effects the agent. If so, it will not follow from the fact that x is good for P that x itself has the intrinsic value. Rather the intrinsic value will be in the relation between x and the person. So if it is the relation that has value, then the agent’s attitude might well be part of what makes x good for P without this violating SUP as I think we should understand it.
@Steve: This is an interesting question, and I think I’ll only be able to gesture. “How well things go for me” is some particular fact about whether I am benefitted or harmed at a particular time. “What is intrinsically good for me” is different: it names those things that would benefit me, or would have an influence on how well things go for me, were they to occur. Take, for instance, the difference between saying, of my totally miserable life: “things are going poorly for me” and “happiness is good for me”, both could be true. The first is some claim about my overall benefits and burdens; the second is a claim about that which determines how and when I’m benefitted and burdened.
I didn’t mean to take a particular stand on the first-order/second-order question; I used “desire” for, simply, ease of exposition. But let me try again. Assume that the normatively relevant attitude is an “x-tude” (first-order desire, second-order desire, belief in the good of, whatever). For the Hobbesian, that which is good for you is the object of the x-tude: y. For the Moorean, that which is good for you is the state of affairs in which you take an x-tude toward y, and y occurs. The problem for the Moorean is that there can be no guarantee, compatible with SUP, that I will bear the normatively relevant x-tude toward that which is good for me, i.e., a state of taking an x-tude toward y and y (whether a D-state, an R-state, and E-state, or whatever). If so, we should be hesitant to say the Moorean view can avoid problems of normatively relevant alienation. But I have a sneaking suspicion we’re talking past each other here.
Hi Dale,
I didn’t quite get your last reply. Let me try this.
Well-being is a function from worlds to numbers. Mooreans and Hobbesians agree on what function this is. Given a description of what desires one has at a world and which ones are satisfied at that world, they agree on what number the world gets. If this is so, any difference between Mooreans and Hobbesians is going to be bookkeeping. Nobody should feel alienated because of bookkeeping differences. (Maybe this is not quite right, because maybe we also need a function from times to numbers. Maybe they’d disagree about which function this is, but it depends on further claims.)
It seems like you accept this story, but you could deny it. You might say that well-being is a function from (*actual desires* and possible worlds) to numbers. Then a possible world where you desire and get a Brownback win wouldn’t get a higher number as a result of that fact, because what you desire at that world is irrelevant; what matters is what you actually desire.
What confused me about your reply was this. You say that a Moorean “need make no reference to my actual desires, pro-attitudes, values, or whatever, in giving a full account of that which is intrinsically valuable for me.” But I don’t see why that would be. The desires are part of the value bearers. So of course they are part of the full account of what is intrinsically valuable for me. Now, if you’re an actualist, I can make some sense of this: in determining the value for me of some other possible world, the Moorean doesn’t need to refer to my *actual* desires, only the ones I have there. But you say the issue is not actualism vs. possibilism. Thus, I am confused.
There is still the matter of what to make of the resonance constraint. If I desire that P, and P obtains, P’s obtaining is good for me. According to the Moorean, P is not intrinsically good for me. You say that’s a problem. Well, let’s use the term ‘contributory value’ to refer to the kind of value P has for me when I desire it and it obtains. Here’s a resonance constraint: the obtaining of a state of affairs has contributory value for me only if I have a pro-attitude toward P. Now the dispute between the Moorean and the Hobbesian reduces to whether we should call the kind of value P has “intrinsic” or “contributory”. That’s a verbal dispute. Everyone agrees about what difference P makes when it obtains, the only difference is over what words to use.
@All: I can’t seem to post responses longer than a paragraph, so, with your kind permission, I’ll respond offline by email. Thanks!
Ben,
“Well-being is a function from worlds to numbers.”
That’s weird. Suppose functions are sets. It follows that well-being is a set. If functions are not sets, it’s still weird to think that my well being is a function, they’re abstract, right?
Are you just saying that well-being can be represented as a function?