Folks, it’s time for some summer fun. And everyone knows what that means — it means McTaggart!
Here’s a question McTaggart wondered about. McTaggart’s discussion of the question appears in The Nature of Existence, vol II., Chapter LXVII.
Suppose that pleasure is intrinsically good, and that the value of a pleasure is partially a function of how long it lasts. If there are two pleasures, p1 and p2, that are otherwise equal, but p2 lasts twice as long as p1, then p2 is twice as good as p1.
Suppose also that there are timeless persons, i.e., persons that exist but do not exist in time. Suppose one of those persons has a feeling of pleasure. How intrinsically valuable is that feeling?
(Grant that we can make sense of timeless persons having mental states.)
McTaggart thinks that the answer is "infinitely valuable", regardless of the intensity of the pleasure. Is he right?