If one of your papers (or a new draft) has recently become available online and you would like me to link to it in the next Ethics Alert, then please send me an email or an email attachment (.doc or .rtf) with the relevant information. […] Read More
This marks the 10th of 11 virtual meetings on Derek Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain. First, though, a programming note: next week, we’ll be discussing chapter 12 of the latest version of Parfit’s manuscript, available here. As it turns out, though, there’s a 13th chapter in […] Read More
In his “Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism” (Philosophical Perspectives 18: 23-44), James Dreier poses an urgent question. (Well, as urgent as questions in “meta-meta-ethics” get.) The question is how to formulate the difference between moral realism and irrealism given that one can always […] Read More
(If one of your papers has recently become available online and you would like me to link to it in the next Ethics Alert, then please send me an email or an email attachment (.doc or .rtf) with the relevant information, following the format used […] Read More
Sorry folks, but I forgot to mention in my post yesterday that Parfit has sent along yet another updated manuscript, with the final chapter bearing the most revisions. What we’ll do, then, is discuss this most up-to-date version of Chapter 12 in two weeks (but […] Read More
This is the 9th of 11 virtual meetings on Derek Parfit’s book manuscript, Climbing the Mountain. In this pivotal chapter, Parfit finally ties together several of the loose threads of the last several chapters to come very close to endorsing a kind of Kantian “supreme […] Read More
There’s going to be a conference on Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain at the University of Reading in November entitled "Parfit Meets Critics — Critical Evaluations of Climbing the Mountain." The critics include James Lenman, Seiriol Morgan, Jenns Timmermann, Gideon Rosen, Michael Ridge, Michael Smith, and Michael […] Read More
I’m pleased to announce that Tim Chappell, Professor of Philosophy at The Open University, has agreed to become the latest contributor here at PEA Soup. Welcome aboard, Tim!
The following is a Pareto principle that concerns reasons for actions as opposed to the standard preferences for outcomes. I call it The Pareto Reasons Principle (PRP): If S must either do x or do y, and S has, with respect to one class of […] Read More