Currently, I’m working on a book entitled Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. (Click on the link to be taken to a web site where you can download individual chapters.) The book is on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, I […] Read More
Jamie and Mark have already had some very helpful things to say about this in email correspondence. I wanted to open up the discussion and see what others think. The proposal is to understand moral utterances along the following lines, what we might call the […] Read More
The McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society and the Program on Global Justice seek up to three post-doctoral fellows for 2010-11.
Suppose that a subject, S, is in some less-than-ideal epistemic position with respect to both the relevant normative facts and the relevant non-normative facts – that is, assume that S faces both normative uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the relevant normative facts) and non-normative uncertainty (i.e., […] Read More
Liz Harman asked me to post the following announcement: To those on the job market, and those with students on the job market: Anyone who does ethics should seriously consider applying for the Harold T. Schapiro Postdoctoral Fellowship in Bioethics at Princeton. The ad says […] Read More
Saul Smilansky's 10 Moral Paradoxes is a delightful book. The paradoxes are easy to appreciate and though it's written in a light and accessible style, it still has plenty of philosophical heft. I'm intrigued by the paradox Smilansky labels the non-punishment paradox. Here's the gist:
John Brunero and I are organizing an annual workshop on Reasons and Rationality to be held at the University of Missouri – St. Louis. This will take place right after your spring semester is over, and right before your summer vacation begins. I hope […] Read More
“The Murphy Institute’s Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at Tulane University is pleased to announce residential Faculty Fellowships for the Incomparability and Measurement of Value2010-2011 academic year. These fellowships, made possible by funds from the Tulane Murphy Foundation, are available to support outstanding faculty […] Read More
There is a powerful argument that is frequently used in metaethics (and elsewhere). It’s based on the idea that disagreement requires shared concepts. Thus, by looking at who we can intuitively disagree with we can determine who we share our concepts with. And, in when […] Read More