HERE IS A LINK to a video dialogue between two PEA Soupers, Jamie Dreier and Mark Schroeder. This is on the recently launched online 'Philosophy TV ' channel. The topic of the discussion is metaethical contextualism, expressivism, and relativism. It's all very helpful, clear, and interesting. […] Read More
Or so I believe, having been fortunate enough to do it in 2007-2008. The Murphy Institute's Center for Ethics and Public Affairs has posted the announcement for its 2011-2012 Faculty Fellowships here. Applications due by November 15, 2010. Keep in mind that next year's fellows […] Read More
Cora Diamond's work in ethics will be the focus of an upcoming conference, "Ethics, Imagination, Forms of Life," to be held September 13-15, 2010 at the Université de Picardie, Aiens, in the North of Paris. Professor Diamond will be commenting on the papers and participating […] Read More
Nominations are open for the second philosophy blog writing prize at 3 Quarks Daily. Follow this link for details.
Congratulations to two of our PEA Soupers who have made the list of the top ten philosophy articles from 2009. Jamie Dreier's "Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement," from Philosophical Perspectives v. 23, and Mark Schroeder's "Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices," from Ethics […] Read More
I am intellectually persuaded by the arguments for Consequentialism. However, like most people in that situation, by my own lights I fail to live up the demands of that moral theory by a wide margin. And again, like most in my situation I suspect, this […] Read More
Many philosophers doubt the possibility of unknowable moral truths. E.g. Thomas Nagel said (in The View from Nowhere, p. 139): I do not believe that the truth about how we should live could extend radically beyond any capacity that we might have to discover it […] Read More
I've had moral dilemmas on my mind lately, and I'm troubled by a common argument given against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. I'm hoping people can help diagnose what's troubling me. And I apologize in advance for the disorganized thinking. Here's the argument: Suppose […] Read More
Supervenience-based arguments for moral naturalism have tended to apply only to moral properties, not to relations. One might have thought that they could easily be generalised so as to apply to relations as well. However, as I'll argue here, this may not be so easy.