Williams, Thick Concepts, and Reasons

At first sight, there seems to be a blatant contradiction between Bernard Williams’s two central theories: his view about thick concepts and his existence-internalism about reasons (many others have hinted at this too – Gibbard and Scanlon, for instance). I want to quickly sketch what that […] Read More

Fitting Consequentialist Agents

I’m interested in defending consequentialism against allegations that it represents an inherently perverse perspective, or that the consequentialist agent would have a morally bad character. For example, critics allege that the consequentialist agent would have ‘one thought too many’, that they would treat others as […] Read More

Does Ought Imply Can Outside Ethics?

[My apologies if this is well-trodden ground.  I am pretty ignorant of the ought-implies-can literature, and quick check over articles didn't reveal anybody discussing what I'm about to write.] In general, philosophers take it for granted that a person morally ought to X if and […] Read More

Princeton Grad Conference in Political Theory

April 8-9, 2011 The Committee for the Graduate Conference in Political Theory at Princeton University welcomes papers concerning any period, methodological approach or topic in political theory, political philosophy, or the history of political thought.  Approximately eight papers will be accepted.