Classical decision theory is built around a central "representation theorem": so long as an agent’s preferences meet certain basic conditions of coherence, we can construct […] Read More
Category: Discussions
Practical conditionals are a problem. We all use conditionals like, “If you want a great steak, you ought to go to Manny’s Steak House.” But […] Read More
Currently, epistemologists seem to be very interested in practical reasons and practical rationality. One good example of this is an interesting new paper entitled ‘Knowledge […] Read More
Update (13 August, 2007). I’ve now written a very short paper on this issue: How to Live a Life Worth Living. As you’ll see, it […] Read More
Derek Parfit has recently circulated an argument against what he calls Non-Analytical Naturalism, which he understands as the thesis that normative truths are reducible to […] Read More
Many philosophers draw a distinction between moral and non-moral reasons for action, or motives, such that questions like, “Are moral reasons always overriding?” and “Can […] Read More
I was reading Dancy’s nonnaturalism entry to Copp’s Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Dancy discusses two arguments against naturalism which Parfit has presented in some […] Read More
One venerable objection against the principle that all motivation derives from desire points to the motive of duty, or practical necessity, as phenomenological evidence of […] Read More
Like many other philosophers, I reject consequentialism in favour of a more deontological approach to ethics. That is, I favour a moral theory that implies […] Read More