In “Two Distinctions in Goodness” (Philosophical Review 1983), Christine Korsgaard argued that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness should not be conflated with the […] Read More
Category: Value Theory
I’m interested in defending consequentialism against allegations that it represents an inherently perverse perspective, or that the consequentialist agent would have a morally bad character. […] Read More
Suppose you are an ordinary virtuous agent. Up until now, you haven’t lived the kind of life that involves making any huge life or death […] Read More
I’m starting to warm up to the objectivist form of act-consequentialism (partly because I think it lacks content) which Doug defended in the previous post. […] Read More
Inspired a bit by Ralph's post critiquing Kant's view of unconditioned or fundamental goods, I've been investigating why Kant arrives at his (in my opinion) […] Read More
In Sir P.F. Strawson’s brilliant 1949 paper ‘Ethical Intuitionism’, I came across a short and seemingly powerful argument for the buck-passing accounts of value and […] Read More
Suppose I wanted to get up to speed on the buck-passing-account literature. What three to five things would you say are "must reading"?
Perhaps three isn't too many, but it does feel unwieldy. Nevertheless, it seems to me these are all different distinctions in value, even though many […] Read More
Sometimes I hear people (well, philosophers) compare the goodness of one thing with the badness of another. They say, for example, the goodness of pleasure […] Read More