Here’s another entry on the paradox of deontology (the first was here). Let a deontological restriction be what Jeffrey Brand-Ballard has appropriately called a nonminimizing […] Read More
Category: Normative Ethics
A couple of months ago, on Orangephilosophy, I posted descriptions of the following two lives: Baby. A three-week-old baby, Baby, dies in an accident. Had […] Read More
Moral luck obtains wherever the moral evaluation of an agent is affected by circumstances beyond that agent’s control. But the judgment that the moral evaluation […] Read More
In a recent review essay, “Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics“, David Copp and PEA Soup’s own David Sobel […] Read More
A number of philosophers have argued that there can be actions that are at one and the same time immoral and admirable. These philosophers sometimes […] Read More
Ronald Dworkin argues, in two lengthy papers (“What is Equality? Parts 1 and 2”, P&PA 1981), that, if we care about equality at all, then […] Read More
A common picture of value determination with respect to pains, pleasures and other such mental states seems to be the following: the intrinsic value of […] Read More
It’s widely believed that maximising consequentialism implies that supererogatory action is impossible. And many philosophers, finding the idea of supererogation intuitively plausible, regard this as […] Read More
According to the fitting-attitudes analysis of value (the FA analysis), to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. For instance, on […] Read More