I’ve been reading Krister Bykvist’s and Jonas Olson’s wonderful paper entitled ‘Expressivism and Moral Certitude’ (HERE). Krister and Jonas argue that ecumenical forms of expressivism […] Read More
Category: Moral Psychology
We act for reasons all the time. Here's an interesting question: (Q1) what kind of thing are those reasons our actions are based on? We […] Read More
I once heard someone maintain something absolutely absurd: A life in prison is just the price for committing murder, he said, and you are "free" […] Read More
In the previous post, I applied Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to argue for the claim that there must be some moral truths that cannot be known. […] Read More
So here’s an idea I’ve been fiddling with for a while and would be interested to hear if anyone thinks that further exploration of this […] Read More
Many philosophers think that whenever we are motivated to act, our motivation always involves a belief. E.g. according to the version of the Humean Theory […] Read More
For people in the Bay Area, or those interested in making a trip to it, there will be a small conference entitled "Mind, Agency, and […] Read More
According to some (but not all) ‘hybrid’ metaethical theories, moral sentences like ‘stealing is wrong’ express both beliefs and desires, but different beliefs for different […] Read More
I’d like to return to one of the favourite topics of Pea Soup for a bit, i.e., the Zombies. Couple of years ago we had […] Read More