Practical conditionals are a problem. We all use conditionals like, “If you want a great steak, you ought to go to Manny’s Steak House.” But […] Read More
Category: Practical Rationality
Currently, epistemologists seem to be very interested in practical reasons and practical rationality. One good example of this is an interesting new paper entitled ‘Knowledge […] Read More
Reasons are facts that count in favor of some intentional attitude, such as a belief, a desire, or an intention to act. And reasons to […] Read More
The following is conceivable: the features that make an action right are not the features which one ought to attend to when reasoning about whether […] Read More
Many philosophers want to use desires to account for rationality, reasons, well-being, and so on. Few of them use actual desires in this project. This […] Read More
Many philosophers today are pursuing a program according to which the notion of a “normative reason” is the most fundamental normative notion. Thus, these philosophers […] Read More
Here’s a quote from Scanlon: A rational person who judges that there to be sufficient grounds for believing that P normally has that belief, and […] Read More
The great discussion on the previous posting got so much off the topic that I thought I’d start another threat just on the interesting issue […] Read More
Here’s an interesting quote from Stephen Darwall’s entry on “Normativity” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: On one popular view, morality is normative for action […] Read More