The following is a Pareto principle that concerns reasons for actions as opposed to the standard preferences for outcomes. I call it The Pareto Reasons […] Read More
Category: Metaethics
This marks the 3rd of eleven “meetings” of our virtual reading group on Derek Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain—see here for further details. Next week, we […] Read More
This marks the 2nd of eleven “meetings” of our virtual reading group on Derek Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain—see here for further details. Next week, we […] Read More
(This marks the first of eleven “meetings” of our virtual reading group on Derek Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain—see here for further details.) This rich and […] Read More
A recent issue of the New Yorker has Malcolm Gladwell’s discussion of the recent book Why? by Columbia sociologist Charles Tilly. Since I’ve not read […] Read More
In another thread, A.N. Prior’s attempted refutation of the is/ought gap came up. Here’s one of Prior’s examples: a. Tea-drinking is common in England.b. Therefore, […] Read More
I’ve been struggling with the question, What feature must a requirement exhibit in order to qualify as a categorical imperative?
I really liked BEARS, though it seems to be extinct now. Uriah and Josh contributed a few juicy PEARs some weeks ago. I like this […] Read More
In their recent “Moral Fictionalism vs. The Rest,” (Australasian J. Phil. 83 (Sept. 2005), 307-330), Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West do a very […] Read More