What was later called expressivism about ethics, and what we can call Wittgensteinian approaches to religion, had their origin in the same place: empiricist theories […] Read More
Category: Metaethics
Many philosophers want to use desires to account for rationality, reasons, well-being, and so on. Few of them use actual desires in this project. This […] Read More
I have a question regarding Buck-Passing about good — two questions, really — and Doug kindly gave me guest poster status so I could ask […] Read More
Many philosophers today are pursuing a program according to which the notion of a “normative reason” is the most fundamental normative notion. Thus, these philosophers […] Read More
I’m unsuccesfully trying to have a break from blogging to get some work done. I cannot resist the temptation to advertise a book review of […] Read More
Here’s a quote from Scanlon: A rational person who judges that there to be sufficient grounds for believing that P normally has that belief, and […] Read More
Having posted on Mackie’s argument from relativity some time ago, I’d like to return to it now and ask whether the argument (or at least […] Read More
Consider the following passage from Scanlon: [B]eing good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing […] Read More
I think Heath’s previous excellent post on the problems of expressivism brings up another problem – a version of the Frege-Geach problem, or a new […] Read More