Many philosophers draw a distinction between moral and non-moral reasons for action, or motives, such that questions like, “Are moral reasons always overriding?” and “Can […] Read More
Category: Metaethics
I was reading Dancy’s nonnaturalism entry to Copp’s Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Dancy discusses two arguments against naturalism which Parfit has presented in some […] Read More
Reasons are facts that count in favor of some intentional attitude, such as a belief, a desire, or an intention to act. And reasons to […] Read More
When I first met Jonathan Dancy three years ago, I remember him mentioning the early emotivist papers in Analysis. One night year and a half […] Read More
Greetings, all. Sorry that my first official post will be so mundane, but here goes. I’ll be teaching an upper-level undergraduate course in metaethics for […] Read More
File this under “meta-meta-ethics” Don Loeb and Michael Gill currently defend a ‘variability thesis’, the view that ordinary moral thought and language contains both cognitivist […] Read More
Thank you all for helping me, in the previous thread, to clarify what is at stake in being able to provide, for expressivism, a logic […] Read More
I have started in on a paper in which I show how expressivists can use a certain kind of semantic theory. The semantic theory, which […] Read More
The following is conceivable: the features that make an action right are not the features which one ought to attend to when reasoning about whether […] Read More